Building regulations - proposed review of fire safety topics: analysis of responses

Source page 1

A public consultation on a proposed review of fire safety topics ran between 13 December 2024 and 7 March 2025. Across 29 questions, of which 24 contained a quantitative element, the consultation sought views on various aspects of fire safety regulations and addressed the two recommendations directed at the Scottish Government made by the Fatal Accident Inquiry (FAI) report into the Cameron House Hotel fire.

In total, 40 consultation responses were received, with six from individuals and 34 from organisations. This report provides an analysis of these consultation responses.

Scope of consultation topics

The consultation set out proposals across six topics:

•Mandating fire suppression for future conversions of historic buildings to be used as hotel accommodation;

•Amending the current scope of application of standard 2.15 on fire suppression systems to lower risk alterations and extensions and conversions;

•Managing risk from the presence of hidden cavities or voids, varying standards of workmanships, age in older, traditional premises;

•Mandating non-combustible external wall cladding systems in new build hotels, boarding houses and hostels with a storey over 11 m in height;

•Several miscellaneous fire safety issues; and

•A call for evidence on three further topics.

Mandating fire suppression

Over six in ten respondents (63%) preferred Option 1, to mandate active fire suppression for conversion of traditional buildings to hotel accommodation, compared to 37% supporting Option 2, a performance/risk-based approach with strengthened guidance. A range of perceived advantages or drawbacks with each approach was given, along with suggestions for how the guidance could be strengthened or aspects to consider. Reasons for supporting Option 1 included that it would aid clarity of approach and that it would lend itself to setting minimum standards, whereas Option 2 was supported as it was felt to be more flexible with the most appropriate systems adopted for each building. Other factors raised by respondents included ensuring there are adequate protections and safeguards in safety approaches, and challenges with retrofitting historic buildings to required standards.

Widespread support was evident for defining the term ‘hotel’, with 89% of those answering strongly agreeing (54%) or agreeing (35%). Open comments suggested how this could be done or factors to consider, along with the need for clear guidance, which some felt could enhance regulation. Equally well supported was a need to define the size and complexity of the building to help consider which buildings should use active fire suppression systems (AFSS); of those answering, 31% strongly agreed and 49% agreed. Varying views were expressed over whether small buildings should be required to have AFSS.

Seven in ten (70%) of those answering supported amending the scope of mandatory standard 2.15 to not include the requirement to low risk extensions and conversions to flats, maisonettes, or social housing dwellings to require use of AFSS. However, caveats included that mandating AFSS could be inappropriate for some buildings or have implications for guidance.

Hidden cavities, voids, workmanship age and variation from standards

High levels of support (83%) were given for retaining the existing wording of paragraph 2.4 of schedule 5, though some suggested amendments or felt the term ‘reasonably practicable’ should be defined further. Suggested changes to the publication ‘Fire safety guidance for existing premises with sleeping accommodation’ (2022) included emphasising the need to address risks, or comments on cavities and voids or on workmanship and ageing materials.

Around two thirds of those answering (64%) strongly agreed or agreed that the principles set out in the current Historic Environment Scotland guidance remain suitable guidance for special risks posed by existing hotels and similar premises. However, some felt no change was needed or felt there was a need to review the guidance, for instance, to ensure it provided clarity for the workforce. A few called for stakeholder engagement as part of this.

Proposed revisions to the Non-domestic Technical Handbook (NDTH) to recommend cavity barriers for certain buildings were supported by two thirds of those answering (67%), notably to promote public safety. Some called for more clarity or work in this area.

Four fifths (84%) of those answering supported the additional guidance indicated in option 2 of Q1 on identifying risk and implementing proportionate mitigating measures, with a range of benefits identified in open comments. Many suggested areas the guidance should address, such as practical solutions, cross-referencing with policies, addressing skills and expertise of the workforce and enforcement issues. Some called for further work to clarify aspects of this guidance.

Extending the ban of combustible external wall cladding systems to hotels,hostels and boarding houses

Many respondents supported extending the ban of combustible external wall cladding to hotels, boarding houses and hostels in relevant buildings, with risks and risk mitigations highlighted. Suggestions included extending the ban to all sleeping accommodations or high-risk buildings, locating guidance together, and adopting a risk-based approach following a full fire risk appraisal. Calls were made to wait for the research findings to help shape policy and for more clarity in the guidance.

Miscellaneous fire safety issues

Almost two thirds (65%) of those answering agreed or strongly agreed that existing guidance on lath and plaster materials is sufficient, while over four fifths (81%) considered existing guidance on low-level emergency lighting is sufficient. More mixed support was evident for removing the need for certain lighting circuits, though most prevalent was a neutral view (43%) or support for the proposal (34%), while 14% disagreed.

The proposal to require External Premises Information to be fitted on all new, converted or refurbished high-rise domestic buildings with any storey at a height of more than 18m above the ground was widely supported (89%). It was felt that this would provide helpful information to fire rescue services. Suggestions for how this could be implemented, such as how the plate should be displayed in buildings, were provided.

Proposed amended wording for clause 2.7.1 to clarify the intent of the ban on combustible materials for certain buildings was supported by over two thirds of those answering (68%), notably as it would provide more clarity. However, 9% disagreed, for reasons such as concerns about potential fire spread or the need for more clarification. Some identified factors to consider, such as using full-scale facade tests to mitigate risks and to emphasise limits on the use of combustible sheathing over 11m.

Alignment with England through amending Regulation 8(4) on extending the exemptions of components that form part of an external wall cladding system which achieve European Classification A1 or A2 to relevant buildings to include those related to components associated with a solar shading device and A1 fl or A2 fl-sf materials used in the top horizontal floor layer of a balcony, provided the entire layer has an imperforate substrate under it, was welcomed by almost two thirds of those answering (63%), though over a quarter (26%) neither agreed nor disagreed. Themes included that aligning with the UK was helpful, that exemptions should be limited, or highlighting risks or risk mitigations.

Amended wording proposed on exit width from rooms in non-domestic properties was supported by almost eight in ten of those answering (77%) as it was felt this would provide more clarity and enhance accessibility and safety. However, 6% disagreed and calls were made to include accurate figures given their importance during construction.

The two proposals to remove Annex 2.B of the NDTH and cite Scottish Health Technical Memorandum (SHTM) 81 Part 1 for new build hospitals, and to cite SHTM 81 Part 2 and 3, were each supported by 72% of those answering, mainly as this was felt to avoid confusion and improve guidance clarity. While 6% were opposed, 23% held a neutral view. On the first proposal, respondents raised factors to consider, such as the links between the two documents. A few called for clarity in guidance on the second.

Around three quarters of those answering (74%) supported the proposal to cite BS 13637. However, almost a quarter neither agreed nor disagreed (23%), and 3% were opposed. A range of factors to consider were identified by some respondents, such as the need for mandated checking and fail-safe devices, a flow chart to illustrate certain processes and that it should complement existing standards.

Call for evidence on current standards

Respondents supported the proposals to undertake further research and gather evidence on BS 476, battery energy storage systems (BESS) and on car parks, and electric vehicles, leaving a range of views. They also supported the proposal to remove the BS 476 standard, suggested risks and risk mitigations for BESS, and suggested a range of evidence or aspects to consider for car parks and electric vehicles.

Impact assessments

One in ten (9%) of those answering felt the proposals would impact equality groups while almost three quarters (73%) did not, and 18% were unsure. Comments included that the proposals would positively impact older, vulnerable or disabled people, for instance, as it would improve their ability to escape fires. Three in ten (30%) felt the proposals would impact businesses, while 39% felt they would not, and 30% were unsure. Potential impacts raised by respondents included those that could affect the workforce and increased costs to achieve compliance. Island communities could be impacted by the proposals, according to 24% of those answering, though 35% felt there would not be an impact, and 41% were unsure. Benefits to rural and remote areas, such as enhancing on-site fire safety, were raised, as were negative impacts, including increased costs and a lack of access to skills.

Proposed delivery programme

Over four fifths of those answering (84%) strongly agreed or agreed with the proposed enforcement date for any amended policy arising from the consultation, with 3% opposed and 13% unsure. Comments centred on the need for sufficient lead-in time and associated actions within the transition period, or that the date should be as soon as possible. One respondent felt the date should be set once any policy review had been undertaken.

Conclusion

There was majority support for many of the proposals presented in the consultation, with respondents also highlighting considerations they felt should be addressed if the proposals are implemented.

Source page 2

Background

The Fatal Accident Inquiry (FAI) report into the Cameron House hotel fire directed two recommendations at the Scottish Government. These were:

•Recommendation 4: The Scottish Government should consider introducing for future conversions of historic buildings to be used as hotel accommodation a requirement to have active fire suppression systems (AFSS) installed.

•Recommendation 5: The Scottish Government should constitute an expert working group to more fully explore the special risks which existing hotels and similar premises may pose through the presence of hidden cavities or voids, varying standards of workmanship, age and the variance from current standards, and to consider revising relevant guidance.

To address these recommendations, the Scottish Government has been undertaking a review through a Ministerial working group on building and fire safety. Two stages were involved in the review. A short-life working group (SLWG) was set up to review the FAI recommendations (which were reported in October 2023). Secondly, an ongoing fire safety expert panel has been created to look at the SLWG’s report and to review other aspects of Scottish building standards and fire safety guidance.

Certain recommendations from the SLWG report have already been implemented, such as amending guidance to promote the use of automatic fire suppression systems (AFSS) for traditional building conversions to hotels, and to require local authorities to inform Scottish Government where future conversions of traditional buildings are to be used as hotels. As part of the ongoing review for longer-term recommendations, a panel of experts have considered mandating AFSS where traditional buildings are being converted into hotels, including the special risks these may pose.

The Scottish Government conducted a public consultation on the proposed review of fire safety topics between 13 December 2024 and 7 March 2025. The consultation consolidated the recommendations made by the expert panel and sought views on proposed changes to building regulations and supporting guidance contained in Section 2: Fire of the Technical Handbooks^[1].

Respondent profile

In total, 40 consultation responses were received, mostly via the online consultation platform Citizen Space, with four of these received in an alternative format^[2]. Six responses were provided by individuals; the remaining 34 were from organisations (see Appendix A for a list of organisations responding). To aid analysis, organisations were grouped by the nature of their work. Table 1 shows the number of each type of respondent.

Table 1: Respondent profile

Analysis approach

The Lines Between was commissioned to provide a robust, independent analysis of the responses to the public consultation. The main purpose of consultation analysis is to understand the full range of views expressed, and, where possible, using closed questions, to quantify how many respondents hold particular views. This report provides a thematic analysis of responses based on the analysis approach outlined below.

Reflecting the knowledge of respondents, it is impossible to detail every response in this report; some, especially organisations, shared lengthy submissions reflecting their specific expertise. Full responses to the consultation, where permission for publication was granted, can be found on the Scottish Government’s consultation website.

Similarly, the technical nature of some of the proposals outlined in the consultation means it is impractical to fully repeat or explain these within this report. Further information on the proposals can be found in the consultation paper. A glossary of terms is included in Appendix B.

Quantitative analysis

The consultation included 24 closed questions. Not all respondents answered every question. To compare across sub-groups, this report presents the results of the closed questions based on those who answered each question. For clarity, each table shows:

•The percentage of respondents from the total sample of 40 respondents who selected each response (grey row).

•The number and percentage response among those who answered each question, broken down by individual and organisation responses (rows including and under “All answering”).

A full breakdown for each question, including a breakdown by each type of organisation answering, can be found in Appendix C. Please note that the row percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.

Qualitative analysis

Qualitative analysis identifies the key themes across responses to each question. The research team developed a draft coding framework based on a review of the consultation questions and a sample of responses. During the coding process, new codes were created if additional themes emerged.

Where appropriate, quotes from a range of the 40 consultation responses are included to illustrate key points and provide useful examples, insights and contextual information.

When reviewing the analysis in this report, we would ask the reader to consider that:

•Public consultations invite everyone to express their views; individuals and organisations interested in the topic are more likely to respond than those without a direct or known interest. This self-selection means the views of respondents do not necessarily represent the views of the entire population.

•Similarly, only a very small number of responses (six) were received from individuals. As such, quantitative results for this group and any comparisons between individuals and organisations should be treated with caution.

•In a few instances, qualitative comments from individuals may not align with their response to the quantitative questions. For example, a respondent may agree in principle but use their open comment to caveat their agreement or suggest an alternative approach.

Weight of opinion

This report presents the themes identified in responses from most to least commonly mentioned. All themes, including views shared by small numbers of respondents, are covered; a view expressed by a very small number of participants is not given less weight than more general comments shared by a majority.

Similarly, all responses have an equal weighting. We recognise this means a response from an individual has the same weight as the response from an organisation which may represent many members, but this approach ensures all views are presented.

Qualitative analysis of open-ended questions does not permit the quantification of results. However, to assist the reader in interpreting the findings, a framework is used to convey the most to least commonly identified themes in responses to each question:

•Many respondents, 15 or more respondents, a prevalent theme.

•Several respondents, between 10 and 14 respondents, a recurring theme.

•Some respondents, between 5 and 9 respondents, another theme.

•A few / a small number, fewer than 4 respondents, a less commonly mentioned theme.

•One respondent; a singular comment or a view identified in only one response.

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This chapter presents the analysis of responses to Q1 to Q4 and Q10. Please refer to the consultation paper for more details, and Appendix D for a list of consultation questions.

•Q1 to Q4 explore the proposals set out in Section 2.1 of the consultation paper. These consider mandating active fire suppression systems in conversions of traditional buildings to use as hotel accommodation.

•Q10 concerns the proposal in Section 2.3 of the paper to amend the scope of application of mandatory standard 2.15, ‘Automatic Fire Suppression Systems,’ to low risk extensions and conversions to flats, maisonettes, or social housing dwellings.

Fire suppression in conversions of traditional buildings to hotels

The Scottish Government identified two options to support the implementation of Recommendation 4 of the FAI. The recommendation is being considered as intended to apply to either all future conversions of traditional buildings into hotels or focused on future conversions of traditional buildings to hotel use with complex and interlinked factors that present a high risk to occupants.

The two proposed options presented in the consultation were:

•Option 1: Mandate active fire suppression for conversion of traditional buildings to hotel accommodation; or

•Option 2: Update the NDTH with performance / risk-based guidance.

The consultation paper set out the scope of the proposal, special risks to be addressed, such as linked cavities or voids, current building regulations about conversions of traditional buildings, and the role of Automatic Fire Suppression Systems.

Q1. Which of the above two options is your preferred approach? Please select only one answer and provide your reasoning in the box below.

Almost two thirds (63%) of those answering Q1 preferred Option 1, with over a third (37%) choosing Option 2. Support for Option 1 was higher among organisations (72%), while individuals preferred Option 2 (83%).

Almost five in six respondents left an open comment to explain their choice. Comments giving reasons for supporting Option 1 were most prevalent, followed by reasons for supporting Option 2, then additional considerations. For ease of reading, themes relating to each Option are presented together.

Comments on Option 1

Many respondents expressed support for Option 1, mandating active fire suppression when converting a traditional building to hotel accommodation. A range of reasons were given, including, in order of prevalence:

•It would aid in clarity, consistency, and certainty of approach, making it easier to assess building layouts and construction type, for instance.

•It can compensate for a range of issues such as deficiencies in means of escape, hidden voids, and the spread of fire and smoke.

•Guidance should set out minimum standards, and this option would achieve that.

Other comments included that this approach could be limited to certain buildings and set out in guidance, such as mandating suppression in larger, higher-risk buildings only, or where it is the appropriate solution.

Achieving standards when converting traditional buildings was noted to be challenging, for instance, because certain risks may only be discovered when a fire breaks out. Therefore, a blanket approach was felt to enhance effective fire safety in such buildings.

“It gives consistency in approach. Also, may compensate for hidden failings in buildings.” – North Lanarkshire Council

Disadvantages of Option 1 were set out by some respondents. These included that it could: create technical challenges requiring careful introduction; have unforeseen consequences such as projects becoming unviable resulting in exemptions being required; be an inflexible and unduly prescriptive solution.

Comments on Option 2

Reasons for supporting Option 2, setting out a performance/risk-based approach with strengthened guidance, were given by several respondents. These centred on Option 2 being a more flexible or holistic approach, where appropriate solutions could be adopted for each building. Two respondents used similar wording to suggest that this Option reinforced the role of design professionals, whereas Option 1 was more product-led, i.e., considering the materials and systems which could be used for fire suppression.

Suggestions for guidance included:

•How to evaluate risks when deciding which building materials, fire prevention practices, emergency evacuation plans and fire-resistant construction to use.

•Starting with a competent Fire Risk Assessment that considers the use of the building and its specific features and characteristics.

•Clarity on when suppression should be installed and any exemptions.

•The risk of external fire spread, particularly in buildings using combustible façade materials.

•The compromised fire performance of potentially deteriorated materials present throughout older buildings.

•Interlinked voids which may assist the undetected movement of fire in a building.

•Guidance on fire response and evacuation.

“We would suggest such guidance is provided with its own independent guidance clause rather than within clause 2.0.7 as proposed. We consider this will provide more gravitas to the requirement for suppression rather than being located within an introductory ‘scene setting’ part of the guidance. Section 6 Energy takes this approach by setting out requirements for conversions within its own specific clause to standard 6.2. Furthermore, the guidance for section 6 conversion was changed in 2023 and calls for evidence to support the approach taken that justifies the approach to compliance with the standards. We believe this call for evidence should be included in the guidance on suppression in traditional build hotels.” - City of Edinburgh Council

Disadvantages of Option 2 were raised by some. These included: safety concerns if conversions inadvertently resulted in special risks; increased insurance premiums if fires did occur; regulatory burden due to the need for interpretation of requirements or building warrant process; increasing the frequency of third-party consultations via Section 34; or that Option 2 did not offer sufficient practical solutions, particularly for firestopping cavities.

“We believe that a strengthening of guidance will be used by some as an attempt to engineer fire sprinklers out of the design for a building when this is frequently not appropriate and does not afford the same degree of protection against fires as other risk based alternatives. As Sheriff Thomas McCartney said in his determination into the deaths [at Cameron House]: "Given the potential added fire protection provided by an active fire suppression system, if such installation was said to be impossible or impractical in specific premises, it may be that such premises are simply not suitable as hotel accommodation." - British Automatic Fire Sprinkler Association

Aspects to consider

Multiple considerations were raised by several, including, in order of prevalence:

•Comments from some on using fire sprinkler systems in suppression systems, such as mitigating challenges when protecting traditional conversions from fires, being cautious about over-relying on this approach, and recognising their limitations.

•More details on expectations being required in the Handbook guidance, with a few calling for a definition of ‘historic’ and ‘traditional’.

•The need to avoid ‘one size fits all’ approaches, for instance, exempting conversions of small traditional buildings to hotel accommodation.

•Ensuring decisions are taken to protect the cultural significance of buildings, including the layout and design of the building, current and past uses, materials used and the associations people have with it.

•More research is required to understand the suitability of using water mist sprinkler systems in traditional buildings, particularly those where construction may not meet modern standards. Respondents noted that the use of water mist may need to be part of an engineered solution rather than as part of the Handbook guidance.

•Extending the Chartered Institute of Building / Royal Institute of British Architects’ ‘A Guide to Safety Critical Elements in Building Construction’ to include safety critical equipment life-cycle performance standards for functionality, availability, reliability, survivability and interactivity. Comments suggested that these standards should form an integral component of Bow-tie barriers layer of protection^[3] to reduce risks to the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) Level for higher risk buildings.

•The need to consider occupant behaviours during evacuations.

•A few highlighted concerns with the cost-benefit analysis presented in the consultation document (see Q27).

Q2. In the context of Option 1, do you consider the term ‘hotel’ needs to be defined?

The consultation document states that if legislation is required to mandate recommendation 4 of the FAI, a definition of ‘hotel’ may be required. Alternatively, a prescriptive limit may be introduced based on size, such as the number of bedrooms.

There was widespread support for defining the term ‘hotel’, with 89% of those answering either strongly agreeing (54%) or agreeing (35%). Just over half (55%) of organisations strongly agreed, with local authorities being most supportive (67% strongly agreed).

Four in five respondents left an open comment. The most prevalent themes were that building type should be considered when defining ‘hotel’, specific considerations, and the need for clear guidance. For ease of reading, this section is structured firstly by addressing comments regarding how hotel should be defined, followed by other themes.

Ways to define a hotel

Three themes emerged about how a hotel might be defined. In order of prevalence, these were to consider building type in any definition, consider occupancy-based factors, and define hotel based on risk.

Many respondents highlighted different types of buildings used for accommodation that should be considered. Respondents suggested buildings similar to hotels that they felt could be included in Option 1, or called for further work to determine how fire safety requirements would apply to those buildings. These included guest houses, serviced apartments or self-catering units, bed and breakfasts, boarding houses, student accommodation, motels, bothies and boutique hotels. One respondent called for clarification about how short-term lets and rental accommodation should be treated.

“There is value in considering whether other similar properties could also benefit from clearer definitions in the context of mandatory standards, i.e. student accommodation, serviced apartments, Airbnb's, short-term lets, etc.” – LABSS (Local Authority Building Standards Scotland)

Some suggested basing the definition on occupancy levels or the number of rooms. Views included that occupancy levels are a factor in fire safety, particularly in means of escape, or that the definition should be based on occupancy rather than the number of bedrooms, because rooms can be occupied by more than one person.

Two respondents commented on using risk ratings to help define hotels, i.e. categorising hotels into low, medium and high risk, with more stringent controls for buildings with higher risk. Suggested fire risk factors inside buildings that could be considered under Option 1 included activities, occupancy levels and facilities, such as the location of cooking facilities.

Aspects to consider

Aspects to consider when defining a ‘hotel’ were noted by several respondents. These included that:

•The current definition is outdated and needs to be updated.

•A definition should be developed and agreed with stakeholders

•It should not be as specific as definitions in the Fire Precautions Act

•A mandate could be widened to other traditional conversions, not just hotels

•Building features, such as construction date, corridor length, number of storeys, and floor area, may need to be specified.

•One construction organisation suggested that any definition of ‘hotel’ should include the provision of overnight accommodation, the presence of dedicated staff, and specific operational facilities and services.

Clear guidance

Some respondents stressed the importance of clearly defining ‘hotel’ in any guidance. Clarity was felt necessary to avoid confusion for designers and verifiers, prevent ambiguity, allow effective guidance application, and ensure systems and measures are applied proportionately. One respondent felt the existing definition was already clear.

“Guidance should be clear and defined as to what is meant by the term ‘hotel ' and whether ‘hotel’ refers to premises where individual bedrooms are the unit of occupancy, or whether the definition extends to buildings which are being used as apart-hotels.” – SFRS (Scottish Fire and Rescue Service)

Clear definition will enhance regulation

Some felt a clear definition of ‘hotel’ could enhance compliance and regulation. Comments included that this would support a robust verification process, clarify which buildings needed to be adapted to meet regulations, reduce the potential for inconsistencies in regulation and compliance, and clarify the scope of adherence to any standard.

“A clear definition will remove the likelihood of inconsistent enforcement of standards and will provide clarity about which buildings are subject to the rules. Without a definition, it may be the case that developers… could misunderstand the intent due to the ambiguity and therefore avoid meeting the regulations.” - Astute Fire Engineering

Q3. If either mandating AFSS or providing guidance on risk-based alternative approaches, do you consider there is a need to define the size and/or complexity of the building being converted? Please provide your reasoning in the box below.

Of those answering 31% strongly agreed and 49% agreed (80% combined) with the need to define the size or complexity of the conversion, with the highest support among local authorities (100%). The remaining respondents were neutral (9%) or disagreed (11%).

Almost four in five respondents left an open comment to explain their answer. The most prevalent view was agreement with the need to define size or complexity, followed by comments on the size of buildings. A range of less commonly mentioned themes about complexity were identified, which are presented together below for ease of reading.

General agreement

Many respondents left broad comments agreeing that there is a need to define the size or complexity of the building being converted. Views included that this could be useful, promote clarity, assist national consistency, be more effective than risk-based approaches, and ensure that any requirements are proportionate.

“Guidance on types of buildings, types of materials, features, or uses could be helpful. However, traditional buildings are of many types and sizes and will have been adapted over their lives. Using a too simple typology could miss some of these characteristics.” – The National Trust for Scotland

Building size

A range of views about building size were expressed by several respondents. Opinions varied on whether small hotels should be included when considering the options. For instance, some felt small hotel conversions would be at lower risk of fire, while others felt the same or worse risks may exist, such as if there was only a single means of escape. Singular comments included that suppression systems were unnecessary for smaller buildings, that larger buildings had more risks, or that the size of the building would influence the type of system fitted, either BS 9251 or EN 12845, therefore the cost of installation in a smaller hotel would be less.

“For simpler, smaller buildings, it might not be cost-effective or necessary to mandate full active fire suppression. Instead, a risk-based alternative approach could be recommended, where the focus is on fire detection, occupant evacuation strategies, and passive fire safety features like fire-resistant materials.” - Astute Fire Engineering

Complexity

A few themes were evident around complexity, notably those relating to building features, internal features, and assessment and verification. Regarding building features, factors highlighted as worth considering included building height, means of escape, construction type and materials, history of alterations, heritage status, and cultural significance.

Some respondents recommended internal features to consider when addressing complexity. These included occupation density and mobility of occupants, occupant activity (e.g. sleeping, familiarity with layout), internal linings, wall/floor interfaces, hidden voids, large open spaces and ventilation systems.

A few respondents commented on assessment and verification, such as guidance being helpful for both designers and verifiers when addressing complexity, or risk needing to be assessed by a qualified fire engineer. Other factors that could add to complexity, raised by a small number of respondents, included the travel distance for emergency services, fire load, overall risk and non-compliance with standards.

“Not all existing traditional buildings will bring the same challenges. As an example, buildings with a complex layout which has developed and been adapted over time, will likely present a higher potential risk to occupants in the event of a fire than buildings with a more straight-forward layout and adequate means of escape. The use of building height, as is already established in guidance could be one appropriate parameter. Consideration of the type of construction and perhaps how much this has been altered over time would be beneficial. For example, lath and plaster vs solid stone with modern linings. Not all traditional buildings are the same although the prevalence of certain materials is much greater in traditional buildings.” - OFR Consultants

Suggested approaches

Some respondents suggested how to approach the size and complexity of hotel conversions in the Options. Comments in addition to those described above included:

•Ensuring any proposals are accompanied by a comprehensive identification of risks with robust justification as to why fire suppression systems are not being used, and what additional mitigation would be provided in their absence (relating to Option 2).

•Initial analysis of existing building space to determine a suitable solution using a fire-engineered approach (for both Options).

•A decision-tree approach, for instance, active fire suppression systems are required due to an accumulation of factors rather than any one factor alone, or to help designers understand the hierarchy of regulatory requirements, such as life safety requirements overruling requirements for conservation.

Q4. Are there any further comments or observations you wish to make on the topic of provision of AFSS on conversion of traditional buildings to hotels or on the options set out? If yes, please add comments below and any background or evidence you consider useful.

Two thirds (67%) of those answering the closed question element of Q4 stated they had further comments and observations. A full data table is in Appendix C.

Seven in ten respondents then answered the open question element of Q4. The most prevalent themes raised were ensuring adequate protections, issues with retrofitting traditional buildings, and the need for guidance.

Ensure adequate protections

Many respondents raised concerns regarding adequate protections and safeguards in fire safety approaches. A range of views were expressed, including the need to adopt the most appropriate system for the building, to ensure specialist fire engineering expertise is obtained, avoiding loopholes, or to widen the scope to include other building types, such as in all traditional buildings being converted to sleeping accommodation, not just hotels. Other ways to achieve protections were mentioned by singular respondents, such as:

•Integrating Human and Organisational Factors engineering into the conceptual, design, construction, operation and maintenance lifecycles for higher risk buildings.

•Introducing the principle of Safety Critical Elements (SCEs)^[4] as part of the role of fire suppression systems.

•Early engagement with an appropriately qualified and experienced fire engineer, to provide high-level guidance on topics such as options for suppression systems, appropriate design standards, hazard classifications, water supply requirement (capacity, etc.), water supply options (reduced capacity, mains, etc).

•Suppression systems should not be the only acceptable solution; for instance, mist systems should be included and acceptable as an alternative.

•Extending the retrofitting of sprinklers beyond residential buildings to buildings used for accommodation, such as hotels, ideally across the whole property.

•To ensure appropriate skills and knowledge in the workforce to minimise the potential for future risks through good workmanship.

Issues with retrofitting

Some respondents highlighted issues with converting traditional and historic buildings that may impact the proposals. Comments included that:

•Existing hotel conversions should be considered, not just future conversions.

•Guidance should clarify that the preferred outcome is as near a compliant building as possible.

•Suppression systems can require dismantling of certain period features, and therefore, other solutions should be considered.

•Older properties are less fire-resistant.

•Sprinklers are better located in new builds.

•BS 9251 could be the installation standard for sprinklers in smaller premises.

“Regarding the challenges of retrofitting sprinklers in small hotels and B&B accommodation, BAFSA acknowledges the clear benefits of using BS 9251 as the installation standard for smaller premises. Table 1 of BS 9251 already classifies Category 3 sprinkler systems as suitable for residential care premises housing more than ten residents, which suggests its suitability for similar small hospitality settings.” - British Automatic Fire Sprinkler Association

Need for guidance

Some respondents suggested ways to strengthen guidance, including two who called for the Scottish Government to consider using a Ministerial direction to require existing hotel operators in traditional buildings to meet the same requirements as those for future hotel conversions. Other views presented by singular respondents included:

•Incorporating a multi-disciplinary approach within regulations to ensure collaboration to create practical and effective solutions.

•Changes in guidance being accompanied by appropriate technical evidence.

•To clarify if the Handbooks will be updated to explicitly support the installation of sprinklers in new and converted student accommodation.

•The need to outline the BS 9521 system as it is being used.

•To define ‘small roof’ or roof cavities within the NDTH, considered necessary to help determine compliance requirements.

•Suggested guidance topics: risk of external fire spread; compromised performance of deteriorated materials; interlinked voids, and fire response and evacuation.

Other issues

Multiple other points were made by respondents. A few felt cost factors should be addressed, for instance, highlighting that the cost of installing suppression systems might make a project unviable, or that water storage may be needed in rural areas due to water supply issues, which increases costs for the owner. One fire engineering organisation noted that water storage requirements could be reduced if other water sources are available, or the domestic water supply can be shared with the sprinkler system.

One felt more consideration was needed for guest actions, such as hotels providing smoke hoods for guests or requiring the host to point out fire escapes relative to the guest’s room and not relying solely on posters on the back of bedroom doors.

Amending the scope of application of mandatory standard 2.15 ‘Automatic Fire Suppression Systems’

Section 2.3 of the consultation paper presented proposals to amend the scope of application of mandatory standard 2.15, ‘Automatic Fire Suppression Systems,’ to low-risk extensions and conversions to flats, maisonettes, or social housing dwellings.

Q10. It is proposed to amend standard 2.15 and/or guidance to recognise the current Direction for low-risk extensions and conversions to flats, maisonettes and social housing dwellings. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning for your answer.

Among those who answered Q10, 28% strongly agreed and 42% agreed (70% in total) with the proposal; 11% disagreed and 19% were neutral. All individuals agreed, as did two thirds (64%) of organisations.

Over half of all respondents left a comment to explain their answer. A range of themes was evident, and despite the support at the closed question, the most prevalent theme was that the proposal may not work for some buildings.

Inappropriate for some buildings

Some respondents expressed the view that the application of standard 2.15 may not be suitable for certain buildings, such as low-risk flats and maisonettes with no existing suppression systems, and felt it could be disproportionate to expect this to be applied. Comments included that: further work was needed to clarify the scope of the proposal; holistic assessment of buildings was needed to clarify the level of fire protection measures required to support the change in occupancy; the exemptions should relate to suppression systems meeting BS 9251; and to consider comments provided during the targetted consultation exercise carried out with LABSS and the SFRS in 2024 on the draft Dispensation of Building Regulations (Automatic Fire Suppression Systems) (Scotland) Direction 2024 dispensation of building regulations.

Implications for guidance

Potential revisions to the guidance were highlighted by some respondents, including:

•Clarification of dispensations in the Technical Handbooks and ensuring a clearly worded mandatory standard and associated guidance.

•Further practical guidance on adhering to the standard, such as in the context of a specific building warrant application.

•Clarification if the regulation applies only to the works or if the entire premises is in scope.

•Setting out how the proposal to apply standard 2.15 relates to the guidance in standard 2.9, as there could be contradictions between the two, in that one may exempt the need for suppression while the other may indicate it is required.

•Addressing costs associated with improving existing structures during conversions.

General agreement

Agreement with the proposal was expressed by some respondents, such as it being an improvement, that it set reasonable requirements or that it was welcomed.

Other views

A few respondents disagreed with the proposal on the grounds that any traditional building could pose a fire risk or could result in lower standards of fire safety. One highlighted a concern whereby conversions may not require installation of suppression, but new builds would be required to do so, though did not comment further on this.

Two local authority organisations used similar wording to highlight a specific point about common escape routes:

“The conditions set for dwellings that use a common escape route do not appear to provide an equal level of protection to the common part of the building. A protected enclosure within the dwelling offers two door separation from the common escape route whereas I am unsure that a single medium duration flat entrance door provides the same level of protection to the common escape route (redundancy). Similarly, the provision of a ventilated protected lobby offers the escape route two door separation plus the benefit of ventilation for smoke dispersal and is therefore the strongest protection to the common escape route. Consideration should be given on whether all three options should be provided as a condition to dispensing with the requirement for suppression.” - City of Edinburgh Council

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The Expert Panel’s approach to addressing recommendation five of the FAI has been to review the guidance for existing hotels and similar premises and the relevant standards and guidance contained in the Non-domestic Technical Handbook (NDTH).

This chapter addresses various recommendations by the Expert Panel about existing guidance, such as to retain existing guidance or to suggest revisions. For more details on each specific proposal, please refer directly to the consultation paper.

Q5. We propose that the wording of paragraph 2.4 of schedule 5 of the Building (Scotland) Regulations 2004 does not require to be amended. Do you agree or disagree? Provide reasoning for your answer.

Of those answering Q5, 14% strongly agreed and 69% agreed with the proposal (84% combined), while 6% were opposed and 11% were neutral.

Over half of all respondents left a comment explaining their answer. The main theme was agreement with the proposal, though less mentioned themes included suggested changes relating to cavities or regarding the phrase ‘reasonably practicable’.

Agree, amendments are not needed

Many respondents, almost half of whom were local authorities, agreed that the wording of paragraph 2.4 did not need to be amended. Reasons included that it was adequate, that the scope and intent of the standard were clear, and that wiring would be upgraded as part of a conversion, so the risk of cavity fires is low.

“This definition is clear and succinct. There is no need to change it.” - The Fire Sector Confederation

Suggested amendments on cavities/voids

A range of comments on voids were given by some. These acknowledged difficulties in identifying hidden cavities or voids in existing buildings and suggested mitigating actions or amendments to the guidance. These included:

•Highlighting the risks of hidden cavities or voids, such as concealed fires being difficult to detect and therefore suppress.

•Requiring alternative mitigation measures to be put in place if cavities cannot be confirmed to meet regulations, such as reduced travel distances to escape routes upon an outbreak of fire, enhanced detection or water mist systems to fill the cavities.

•Recognising that it can be challenging to investigate existing construction in listed buildings to identify cavities and the cavities being fire stopped as required to prevent movement of smoke and fire.

•Adding the following wording, after the word ‘inhibited’ in paragraph 2.4: ‘to the cavity SCE performance standard of its building risk assessment’.

Clarify ‘reasonably practicable’

A few respondents felt that the term ‘reasonably practicable’ set out in Schedule 6 could be further clarified or qualified. Suggestions included outlining where additional costs may be unreasonable, highlighting situations where an existing hazard may present an intolerable risk if additional measures are not put in place, and acknowledging that someone with appropriate skills, knowledge, and experience should address specific considerations for heritage properties.

“Currently for conversions, the building as converted shall meet the requirements of this standard in so far as reasonably practicable, and in no case be worse than before the conversion. If this is to be applied to conversions, regulations 12, schedule 6 will have to be changed to compliance with the mandatory Standards from the current requirement as ‘no worse than before the conversion’.” - Individual

Other comments

A few respondents made other comments, such as the need to encourage the use of innovations such as cavity barrier technologies, Ground Penetrating Radar surveys, or echo-location scanning. The need to revise guidance in line with recommendations from an expert panel was also raised, as was the suggestion to target guidance at the building owner, designers, and relevant persons to ensure a robust approach prior to the submission of any building warrant application.

Other amendments were suggested by a few. These were to define the word ‘inhibited’ and set performance standards for it based on the risk assessment for higher-risk buildings, to include the Barrier principle of SCEs, and to highlight risks from poor workmanship, ageing materials and variance from standards.

“We believe that the non-prescriptive wording used in schedule 5 of the Building (Scotland) Regulations 2004 leaves much room for interpretation and therefore can result in variations in the application of the standards, thus leading to significant discrepancies in the fire safety of buildings. However, changing the functional requirements given in Schedule 5 of the Building (Scotland) Regulations 2004 would require significant and complex changes to the regulations, which may best be addressed separately to this consultation.” - Rockwool Ltd.

Q6. The Scottish Government publication Fire safety guidance for existing premises with sleeping accommodation (2022) is currently being reviewed. Please provide any comments on the guidance in the text box below with regard to the special risks which existing hotels and similar premises may pose through the presence of hidden cavities or voids, varying standards of workmanship, age, and the variance from current standards (Recommendation 5 of the Cameron House FAI).

Almost two thirds of all respondents left comments on the guidance in relation to the special risks posed. The most prevalent themes were suggested changes to the guidance, the need to address risks and comments on cavities/voids.

Suggested changes to the guidance

Several respondents suggested changes to the current guidance. Topics any review should consider were highlighted, such as:

•Special risks faced by existing hotels and similar properties.

•Inspections for hidden fire hazards.

•Retrofitting and upgrading systems to meet current fire safety standards.

•Poor workmanship and aging materials.

•Fire prevention, evacuation and compartmentation.

•Suppression systems and their benefits and protection methods.

•Restricting the spread of fire and smoke.

•Providing site-specific fire safety protocols addressing the fire risks of each building.

Other views varied but included suggestions to:

•Ensure any review keeps abreast with, and can support, potential changes to standards and guidance through alignment with other policies and guidance.

•Better define guidance on insulated core panels given the ‘various’ insulation types can range from non-combustible to highly combustible (Chapter 6, Clause 192).

•Remove perceived outdated references to Category 0 and 1 in Chapter 6, Clause 195, and replace with the BS EN 13501-1 classification.

•Clarify when EN 12845 or BS 9251 is to be used.

“Chapter 6, Clause 192 - Guidance on insulated core panels (sandwich panels) could be better defined as the 'various' insulation types can range from non-combustible to highly combustible and there are both British Standard tests and insurance testing which can be used to demonstrate levels of safety for these products and this document would benefit from a better understanding of the hierarchy of performances available, instead of the current generic summary.” - Building Systems UK (A Tata Steel Enterprise)

Guidance must address the risks

Addressing the special risks in any guidance was recommended by several respondents. Aspects suggested for inclusion were highlighting risks, acceleration of remediation to address existing risks, including a case study on managing risks, addressing concerns around firestopping and cavity barriers, and the role of risk assessments. One organisation recommended that the industry be financially supported to help minimise risks. Historic Environment Scotland (HES) noted how they had incorporated information about fire risks into their guidance on managing fire in historic buildings:

“Our ‘Managing Change in the Historic Environment: Fire and Historic Buildings’ guidance (2023) provides advice about fire safety and fire damage in historic buildings. Part 1 details the specific fire risks present within historic buildings such as the nature of the building, including its age, history of adaptations, and use of combustible materials. It also outlines the key considerations for decision-making, including the relevant policies, consents and permissions, and can help to mitigate the impacts of potential changes on cultural significance.” - HES

Comments on cavities and voids

Several respondents commented on aspects the guidance should cover concerning hidden cavities and voids to help address their fire risk. Singular points included:

•To require the use of cavity barriers during conversions, or if omitted, to require significant justification.

•Linking suppression systems to the smoke and fire risk through voids in the context of the type of buildings covered by the consultation.

•The view that guidance will not do much to mitigate unknown risks, such as poor workmanship or hidden voids.

•Recognising that modular construction can have specific risks, such as 3D modules that may have voids that can create unseen travel paths for fire and smoke.

One respondent recommended noting the expertise of hotel owners and developers who have experience dealing with hidden cavities and voids.

Comments on workmanship and ageing materials

Risks with varying standards of workmanship or materials were raised by some, with suggestions given to mitigate these risks. These included ensuring assessors are suitably qualified and experienced, improving workforce skills and capacity, improving collaboration between installation contractors on projects, periodic inspection and testing during construction and greater attention to the need for detailed specifications.

“SFRS and other fire and rescue services can cite numerous examples where poor construction has resulted in unexpected fire spread and premature building failure in the event of a fire. The primary responsibility for addressing this lies with the construction industry. However, one of the key failings is the interaction between contractors installing different elements of construction, sometimes resulting in unintended consequences and failures. Therefore, periodic inspection and testing during the construction process, particularly to check elements of construction that will be hidden in the final building, is vital.” – SFRS

Q7. Although planned for review it is proposed that the principles set out in current HES guidance remains suitable guidance for special risks which existing hotels and similar premises may pose through the presence of hidden cavities or voids, varying standards of workmanship, age, and the variance from current standards (Recommendation 5 of the Cameron House FAI). Do you agree or disagree? Provide reasoning for your answer.

The consultation paper notes that guides from Historic Environment Scotland aim to provide advice regarding the application of the Building (Scotland) Regulations 2004 to the conversion of traditional buildings, briefly outlining each.

61% of respondents answering Q7 agreed with the proposal, while 3% strongly agreed with it (64% in total). A further 33% were neutral, and 3% disagreed. While no organisations disagreed with this proposal, 34% were neutral.

Half of all respondents left an open comment to explain their answer. The most prevalent views highlighted differing opinions between those who believe the existing guidance is adequate and does not need updating and those who believe a review is needed.

No change needed

Some respondents agreed that the current HES guidance is sufficient and may not need to be changed, though respondents tended not to comment on whether a review should be undertaken. It was felt that the guidance remained suitable and relevant and should be used in conjunction with other referenced standards.

A review is needed

Support for a review was expressed by some respondents. Views included that an update was overdue, particularly considering recent fires in traditional buildings and innovations in the area, that there should be an increased focus on suppression systems, and that a manufacturing survey could help identify new products that could be applied. A few noted that a review may identify no changes being required.

Clarify for the workforce

Comments that the guidance should help the workforce address the special risks were provided by a few respondents, such as enabling a better understanding of how a proposed change will impact historic or traditional buildings or helping designers deal with challenges. One felt a refined definition of ‘hotel’ would assist the workforce to gain clarity, while another thought appropriate and specific advice would be needed to accompany written guidance.

Stakeholder engagement is needed

A few respondents felt that raising awareness of any guidance changes would be needed, such as with building owners and operators. One organisation felt a separate consultation was required to address key aspects such as alignment with best practices and policies, and with guidance on deteriorated building materials and the use of traditional buildings as sleeping accommodation.

Q8. We propose to change the guidance in the Non-domestic Technical Handbook to recommend cavity barriers at 10m or 20m centres above fire resisting ceilings depending on the European classification for reaction to fire (A-F) of the surface exposed in the cavity. This provision would not apply to small floor or roof cavities above a fire resisting ceiling that extends throughout the building or compartment up to a maximum of 30 m in any direction. Do you agree or disagree? Provide reasoning for your answer.

Of those answering Q8, 14% strongly agreed and 53% agreed (67% in total) with the proposed changes, while 8% disagreed. A quarter (25%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the proposed changes.

Over half of all respondents commented to explain their answer. The main themes were reiterating agreement and the need for more clarity or work on the proposal.

Agreement

Several agreed with the proposed change to guidance, mainly because it would enhance safety. For instance, cavity barriers could help prevent the spread of fire. A few caveated that the proposal should not result in lower safety levels than existing building standards.

“We support an enhancement of cavity barriers to prevent fire spread to other parts of a building affected by fire. Fire suppression is part of a system of fire safety. Experience tells us that cavity barriers are frequently breached during building works affecting compartmentation and therefore this does not in any way negate the need for fire suppression.” - British Automatic Fire Sprinkler Association

More clarity or work is needed

Some respondents called for more work to be done on this proposal. A range of views were expressed, generally seeking further detail to allow a considered response. In terms of the topic, suggestions included considering what the cavity barrier is fixed to and its fire resistance, whether sufficient space exists to install a cavity barrier, defining ‘practitioners’ and expected competencies, and acknowledging that subdivision of cavities above fire resisting ceilings may be of limited benefit in buildings with AFSS. Other areas where it was felt further definition or work was needed included:

•Reasoning behind the proposal and clarity of intent.

•The effectiveness of the proposal to be considered by fire safety experts.

•To better understand the implications for traditional interiors, particularly where the ceiling itself was of cultural significance, e.g. ornamental plaster or painted.

•To review costs to the industry to meet this requirement.

•To assess the level of enforcement required to ensure obligations are met.

“The consultation does not appear to provide sufficient detail of why this specific recommendation is being put forward. On the one hand it appears to be in support of repurposing properties with extensive voids into hotel and on another it appears to be contrary to the comments made in the consultation document. We note that the proposal appears to follow the guidance of other devolved government documents. However, those requirements sit within a broader context of cavity barriers, tighter controls on reaction to fire ratings and therefore cannot alone be the reason to support this proposal. As acknowledged in the consultation there is no redundancy if the fire resisting ceiling is breached. The wording of small roof or wall cavities is imprecise. There needs to be some level of detail to this caveat. We can see that mandating the provision of sprinklers and/or other suitable suppression systems could provide that redundancy for the general case. Outside of this, the detail is not clear enough to conclude.” - The Fire Sector Confederation

Other comments

Two respondents felt cavity barrier installation should be required for all conversions due to the potential for hidden fires. One felt the proposal was in line with provisions in England and Wales. One fire engineering organisation, which was neutral about the proposal at the closed question, commented:

“The fire resisting ceiling is understood in this context to be an alternative to the provision of cavity barriers in line with compartment walls (often used should it be difficult to provide cavity barriers). If this is the case, and cavity barriers are to be required above the fire resisting ceiling, then there may be little benefit in providing the fire resisting ceiling in terms of buildability. Should the cavity be free from combustibles and ignition sources there would be limited benefit to providing cavity barriers. It is understood that this provision is intended to allow redundancy of fire safety systems in case the fire resisting ceiling fails but this type of secondary provision is not required elsewhere.” - OFR Consultants

Q9. It is proposed that the additional guidance indicated in option 2 of question 1 (clause 2.1.9 of the consultation), on identifying risk and implementing proportionate mitigating measures, be included within clause 2.0.7 (alternative approaches) and clause 2.15.7 (Conversion of traditional buildings to hotel use) of the Non-domestic Technical Handbook to strengthen and add to existing guidance. Do you agree or disagree? Provide reasoning for your answer.

Of those who answered Q9, 27% strongly agreed and 57% agreed with the proposed changes at Q9 (84% in total), including all individuals. Of the remainder, 3% were opposed, and 14% neither agreed nor disagreed with the proposal.

Over six in ten of all respondents left an open comment to explain their answer. The most prevalent themes were agreement with the proposal, concerns that guidance should, or that more clarity is needed.

Agreement

Wide-ranging support was given by many respondents to the proposal. Support was expressed for the revised wording, as well as the need for additional information to support the workforce involved in conversions. For instance, it was felt that the proposal would assist designers and verifiers in assessing the suitability of different fire safety systems, improve risk assessment knowledge, prevent further incidents, and promote information and data sharing between professionals.

“Change should be mandated within the guidance to prevent further incidents occurring. The above text provides additional guidance which allows building owners to understand the key risks associated with the conversion of traditional buildings should an alternative approach be identified as appropriate.” - Arup Fire

Aspects the guidance should address

Many respondents identified aspects they felt the guidance should address or identified perceived challenges in this area. Suggestions included, in order of prevalence:

•Practical solutions: put more emphasis on installing suppression systems, minimising the impacts of proposed change on the cultural significance of a traditional asset, determining possible measures when AFSS is not suitable, and mandating the installation of fire prevention measures even where AFSS is not appropriate.

•Cross-referencing with policies: using the ALARP assessment methodology commonly used by those dealing with Major Accident Hazards and ensuring the proposed guidance ‘Fire Safety in Traditional Buildings for Duty Holders’ addresses these issues. One respondent noted the only reasonably practicable standards in Section 2 are 2.2, 2.4, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8 and 2.12.

•Skills and expertise: ensure those involved in design, installation and verification have appropriate training, knowledge and expertise to be aware of, and respond appropriately to, the risks involved.

•Enforcement: Addressing challenges associated with enforcement, ensuring mitigating actions are taken for buildings with extensive voids, such as recognising these may not be suitable for sleeping accommodation.

More clarity needed

Some respondents called for more detail or clarity on the proposals. In order of prevalence, suggestions included:

•Adopting a prescribed process for ‘reasonably practicable’ as it is open to interpretation and to avoid inconsistencies.

•Avoiding loopholes by setting minimum standards to prevent lesser standards from being accepted due to improvements being deemed disproportionate.

•The need to update the Guide for Practitioners 6, which was considered out of date and refers to superseded versions of BS 9251 and other standards.

Two respondents highlighted challenges to achieving higher standards for all conversions, notably that the Scottish Fire and Rescue service may be required to highlight risks and request that hotels continue to be occupied as part of their annual checks on these buildings. Another called for changes to a traditional building to be carefully considered, possibly requiring specific permissions and special technical advice.

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The Scottish Government introduced a ban on combustible external wall cladding systems in 2022 for ‘relevant buildings’, as defined in the regulations but excludes hotels, boarding houses and hostels. In line with a change in scope in England to include hotels, boarding houses and hostels, the Scottish Government are seeking to reassess the Scottish ban to include these building types.

The Building Research Establishment (BRE) is conducting research on the topic, with Phase 1 identifying cases for exploration in Phase 2 work, among other things. The Building and Fire Safety Expert Working Group is awaiting results of Phase 2 to inform a consensus view on the evidence base to mandate a requirement to extend the ban on combustible external wall cladding systems to hotels, board houses and hostels.

Q11. Please confirm any evidence, contribution or initial comment that would help towards this policy direction.

Over six in ten respondents gave their views on this topic. The most prevalent themes were agreement with the proposal, to wait for research findings to inform developments, and wider comments about factors that can create or reduce fire risks. It should be noted that as well as comments on the policy direction, other respondents commented more generally on issues with combustible external wall cladding systems.

The ban should be extended

Many respondents felt the ban on combustible external wall cladding should be extended to hotels, boarding houses and hostels. Reasons for support included that: it was in the interest of public safety; that it would be in line with England; combustible cladding can cause fire to spread rapidly and defeat any fire safety design; there is no practical difference between hotels, boarding houses and hostels and domestic properties; occupants would be at risk otherwise; and the costly impact of fires to communities.

Suggestions included extending the ban to all sleeping accommodations or high-risk buildings, locating all guidance and necessary information in one place, and adopting a risk-based approach following a full fire risk appraisal of the external walls or holistic solutions that acknowledge the wider aspects of fire engineering.

Risks associated with combustible cladding materials on hotels, boarding houses and hostels were highlighted, such as:

•Delayed evacuation.

•Staff uncertainty.

•Occupant behaviours and characteristics, such as being unfamiliar with their surroundings, being asleep or intoxicated, and language barriers.

•Quality of workmanship.

•Protection systems being overwhelmed by fire.

•Cladding materials, insulation type, cavities, cavity barriers and sheathing boards.

“Extending the ban of combustible external wall cladding systems to hotels of a certain size/height/occupancy would make sense (especially in hotels without AFSS).” - LABSS

Wait for research findings

Some respondents referred to the current research cited in the consultation paper and either agreed with the need for research in this area or suggested using its findings to inform next steps in this area. One construction organisation highlighted that a cladding system deemed non-combustible in small-scale laboratory testing may have poor fire resistance or perform differently when assembled at scale as part of a cladding system.

“SFRS would welcome and support the move to review research and look toward including hotels, boarding houses and hostels in the ban on combustible external wall cladding systems which would align with England.” - SFRS

More clarity needed

More clarity was sought by some respondents. Areas highlighted included further defining which buildings would be impacted, such as whether low rise buildings are considered the same risk as higher ones or to clarify that the ban would not apply where no work on external walls is required, given that Standard 2.7 and Regulation 8 is not included in Schedule 6 of the 2004 Regulations. Other calls for clarity included consideration of how a ban would impact the cultural significance of traditional buildings and to outline how decision makers can minimise the impacts of proposed changes. One organisation expressed concern about the evidence underpinning the policy and indicated other aspects of fire safety should be highlighted:

“Whilst the ambition of improving fire safety is recognised in the ban on combustible external wall cladding, it is based upon BS 8414 testing which is an often criticised test and the ban perhaps inadvertently ignores other important aspects of fire safety.” - Building Systems UK

Ways to reduce risks

Some highlighted mitigating factors they felt could reduce risks associated with banning the use of combustible cladding in hotels, boarding houses and hostels. These included:

•Using a common approach to removing or mitigating fire risk from external roofs, walls or their attachments.

•The need for robust management practices to support fire strategies in buildings.

•Adopting a broader approach to fire safety e.g. fire resistance (how well the cladding system holds up under fire conditions) and fire strategy (how well the cladding prevents the spread of fire), which was considered lost with a blanket approach.

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The FAI report stated that: “Other points, such as in respect of lath and plaster wall coverings, the presence of any fire-resistant material, and low-level emergency lighting were not matters explored in evidence to such an extent that this Determination can make any specific finding on these points. Nonetheless, these points can be expected to be part of the broader consideration by the expert working group exploring the risks posed by all such buildings used as hotel premises, which has been recommended in this Determination.”

Q12 to Q22 of the consultation paper explore these wider fire safety issues, along with other wider fire safety topics. More details are provided in the consultation paper.

Lath and plaster and materials

Q12. The expert panel proposes the existing guidance is fit for purpose and requires not further action in this context. Do you agree or disagree? If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions on how the current guidance could be improved.

56% of respondents answering Q12 agreed that existing guidance is sufficient, while 9% strongly agreed (65% in total). One quarter (26%) were neutral and 9% disagreed.

Four in ten respondents commented to explain their answer. The main themes were agreement that existing guidance was sufficient and the need for robust risk management.

Agree, guidance is fit for purpose

Some respondents reiterated their views that the guidance is fit for purpose and did not require revisions. Reasons included that the issue is addressed by the existing guidance on lath and plaster published by HES, the Guide for Practitioners 6 document currently being revised, and other external publications.

“The existing guidance is sufficient in highlighting the fire risks associated with this form of traditional construction.” - Comhairle Nan Eilean Siar

Strengthening risk management

A few respondents, who recorded various views at the closed question, suggested clearer guidance is needed on managing risks associated with lath and plaster materials. It was noted that such risks were well recognised, but respondents called for more practical guidance on managing such risks, or guidance on when risks should be addressed to avoid confusion and mistakes by the workforce. One fire engineering organisation highlighted that they had seen lath and plaster ceilings fail within 20 minutes in a fire resistance test, and that remedial upgrade systems are available.

Practical guidance needed

Aligned to the theme above, a few suggested that the guidance should be more practical. Singular suggestions were that it could contain links to all supporting documentation and that it should be streamlined.

Low level emergency lighting

Q13. The guidance provided in BS 5266-1 is considered to provide sufficient illumination to assist in escape at low level and satisfy the mandatory standard. Low level way finding systems may be used to supplement protected or emergency lighting and can be considered on a case by case basis as part of the fire risk assessment. It is proposed that this key message is strengthened in existing fire safety guidance. Do you agree or disagree? If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions on how the current guidance could be improved.

Of respondents answering Q13, 64% agreed and 17% strongly agreed with the proposal to retain the guidance (81% in total), with 6% opposed and 14% neutral.

Over half of all respondents left an open comment at Q13, with the main themes being agreement with the proposal, agreement that it should be used on a case-by-case basis, or other considerations.

Agree, guidance is sufficient

Several respondents agreed that the guidance did not need to be changed. Reasons included the benefits of low-level lighting, such as its usefulness in complex situations, enhancement of wayfinding and evacuation safety, additional benefits for those with visual impairments, assistance for firefighters when tackling fires, and the fact that smoke rises and may obscure ceiling-level lighting.

“Low level escape route lighting could be useful in complex buildings with complex routes of escape to help those escaping.” - Scottish Borders Council

Agree, use on a case-by-case basis

Some respondents agreed low level lighting solutions should be considered on a case-by-case basis. Reasons for using it included that it could be useful as part of a fire protection system, that it could enable fire risk assessors to consider the best course of action, that it could prevent more costly or additional systems being needed and that it could be useful for supplementary protection.

Other considerations

Others commented on low level lighting solutions more generally. Views ranging from LED (light emitting diode) technology making it an affordable solution to a view that it was not cost effective, agreeing it should not be mandated for all buildings, as it was very rarely the case that people would need to crawl along escape routes below a smoke layer. However, on this latter point, one fire engineering organisation highlighted it would still be valuable as a backup on the occasions when it was required:

“Emergency lighting is sufficient to assist in escape and is not intended to be designed for double failure (i.e power failure and smoke present within the corridor). In the event that an escape route does become smoke logged, low level way finding may assist in the evacuation of occupants.” - Arup Fire

A few respondents left varied views. These were that:

•A fire assessor may not be capable or qualified to judge whether to recommend low level lighting without consultation with an emergency lighting expert.

•The guidance citing BS 5266-1 should be strengthened for existing buildings.

•It was unclear when and where low-level lighting would be used; therefore, expectations should be set from the beginning.

•An emergency escape kit could be provided for occupants, containing a torch, smoke hoods and a whistle.

Q14. The expert panel proposes revision of guidance in standard 2.10 to remove the need for a separate and fire resisting escape route lighting circuit. Do you agree or disagree? If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions on how the current guidance could be improved.

Mixed support was evident among respondents answering at Q14, with 34% agreeing and 9% strongly agreeing (43% in total), while 14% disagreed and 43% were neutral.

Over four in ten respondents left comments explaining their answers. The themes highlighted were agreement with the proposal, that more information was needed, comments on circuits, and the need to adopt a case-by-case approach.

Agree, remove this need

A few respondents endorsed this proposal. Comments included that clear or strengthened guidance would be required to ensure standards are met and are in the interest of public safety. One individual felt occupants should use torches instead.

More information needed

A few respondents called for more information about the proposal. Areas highlighted were for the rationale behind the proposal to be made clear, and calls for clarity on specific changes being proposed, such as whether new builds were to be included. This respondent felt that Technical Standards section 2.10.2 already allowed for the installation of self-contained emergency lighting rather than a protected circuit.

“Proposal is unclear. Low-level lighting may be ok to supplement lighting provided by a protected circuit or as an alternative solution to be considered on a case-by-case basis.” - Orkney Islands Council

Comments on circuits

Comments on self-contained emergency lighting circuits were made by a few respondents at Q14, and a few who welcomed the proposal to remove the fire-protected circuit at Q15 which have been included here to remove repetition.

These included that:

•Self-contained emergency lighting is the industry standard, so the proposal made sense. Separate protected circuits were considered no longer used.

•It was possible to remove protected circuits, given that longer-life battery backups could be used.

•Circuits are only self-contained when operated with sealed batteries.

•Electrical circuits in certain historic or traditional buildings are not designed to current standards and may pose a greater fire risk or be readily affected in the event of a fire.

Adopt a case-by-case approach

A few respondents recommended adopting a case-by-case approach. These advocated replacing the requirement with a fire risk assessment of the need for a separate, fire-resistant escape route lighting circuit. Two respondents felt fire-protected circuits should remain. They felt high-level lighting may fail in a fire or should remain until research and testing have shown a robust system of self-contained lighting providing the same level of protection.

“Ensuring all buildings review the need for separate and fire-resisting escape route lighting circuits on a case-by-case basis ensures that appropriate fire safety measures can be applied based on the unique layout and structure of each building.” – Propertymark

External premises information plates

The Scottish Government has proposed requiring an external premises information plate to be fitted on all new, converted, or refurbished high-rise domestic buildings with any storey at a height of more than 18 m above the ground.

Q15. It is proposed to insert new guidance clause 2.14.10 External Premises Information as detailed. Do you agree or disagree? If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions on how the current guidance could be improved.

High levels of support were evident among respondents answering for the proposal at Q15, with 58% agreeing and 31% strongly agreeing (89% in total), and none disagreeing. 11% neither agreed nor disagreed.

Half of all respondents left an open comment to explain their answer. The main themes evident were agreement with the proposal and suggestions for implementation.

Agreement with the proposal

Many respondents endorsed the proposal. The predominant view was that this would help firefighters manage fires. It was felt that the plates would provide fire and rescue services with concise and vital information, allowing critical features of a building to be quickly identified. In turn, this would improve efficiency and response times by enhancing operational decision-making and interventions. Other positive comments were that this approach would help fulfil the action in response to the Grenfell Inquiry Phase 1, and that it was believed to be good practice.

Suggestions for implementation

Suggestions for implementing this proposal were given by some respondents. The most prevalent view was that a digital register of information could contain the data referenced on information plates, or any information relevant to high-risk buildings. This could be used as needed by local fire services. The Scottish Government, Scottish Fire and Rescue Service or the Building Safety Regulator were suggested as organisations who could be responsible for any register. One respondent felt a digital register would help compliance:

“We would advocate that a digital register of building types should be developed by Scottish Fire & Rescue to ensure that all High Risk Buildings are on a database (similar to London Fire Brigade's Pre-Incident Plans) and that fire safety inspections are current, compliance with the Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 by the Responsible Person (Duty Holder) is current and this data is then available in advance of site attendance.” - Building Systems UK

Two respondents advocated extending the requirement to residential blocks irrespective of height, or to extend it to all such buildings of 11m or above in height/with four or more storeys, to assist fire services and standardise arrangements. On the latter option, the respondent suggested this would be align with other Scottish guidance and regulation:

“For example, this provides a comparable height threshold to both the definition of ‘relevant building’ under Regulation 8 of the Building (Scotland) Regulations 2004 as well as the preferred definition of ‘high-risk residential building’ given by 83% of respondents to a previous consultation issued by the Scottish Government.” - Rockwool Ltd.

Other comments

A few commented on where information should be located on a building. Two did not support the proposal to have plates in yellow above main entrance doors and made alternative suggestions. These were to locate them to the side of doors, just within main common entrance doors to blocks or on a box like a dry riser inlet. One respondent called for the plates to be in a standard location and format.

One respondent called for definition of ‘refurbishment’ to understand when verifiers should require information plates on existing buildings subject to a building warrant.

Clause 2.7.1 of the Domestic and Non-domestic Technical Handbook

The consultation document proposed changes to the wording in clause 2.7.1. of the Technical Handbooks and sought views on these.

Q16. It is proposed to amend the wording in 2.7.1 as detailed. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions on how the current guidance could be improved.

Of respondents answering Q16, 65% agreed and 3% strongly agreed with the proposal (68% in total), while 9% disagreed and 3% strongly disagreed. Over a fifth (21%) neither agreed nor disagreed. Local authorities were most likely to lend support compared to other organisation types.

Almost six in ten respondents left an open comment. The most prevalent themes were to welcome the clarity provided by the proposed amendments, disagreement, or factors to consider with the proposed amendments.

Agree, clarity welcomed

Several respondents felt the proposed amendments either provided more clarity and removed ambiguity, or agreed strengthened guidance was needed to provide clarity. Comments were generally brief though the proposals were described as welcome, helpful and that they ‘made sense’.

Reasons for disagreement

Perceived challenges with the proposed amended text were highlighted by some respondents, who mainly disagreed with the proposal. Singular comments were that:

•The sheathing/backing board in any external wall system may contribute to the fire itself, fire growth, and fire spread.

•If the stability and support of the cladding depends on the backing board being in place, then it is part of the cladding system and should therefore fall within the relevant requirements, particularly the fire classification A/B.

•Sheathing or backing board providing rack resistance should be excluded from the same non-combustible requirements in the event of a fire. If the structure deflects excessively due to failure of the sheathing used for racking, then the non-combustible cladding system may be compromised. Therefore, both are interlinked.

•The guidance was unclear in reference to the European Classification. For instance, stating that the external wall cladding system (excluding sheathing or backing board) should achieve European Classification X, where the corresponding European Classification X test must be carried out on a specimen with sheathing or backing board, air gaps, etc.

•The wording did not sufficiently differentiate between loadbearing and non-loadbearing sheathing and/or backing board/panels. This respondent provided alternative wording to replace the proposed amendments:

“External wall cladding systems - mean non-loadbearing components attached to the buildings structure, for example, composite panels, clay or concrete tiles, slates, pre- cast concrete panels, stone panels, masonry, profiled metal sheeting including sandwich panels, rendered external thermally insulated cladding systems, glazing systems, timber panels, weather boarding and ventilated cladding systems. For the purposes of compliance with the building regulations and associated standards, external wall cladding systems also include spandrel panels and infill panels. Many external wall cladding systems incorporate non-loadbearing backing boards or panels, support rails, fixings, thermal insulation, fire barriers and cavity barriers located behind the outer cladding. Load-bearing sheathing or backing board - attached to the frame to provide structural support is not considered to form part of the external wall cladding system. However, where combustible, load-bearing sheathing or backing board is proposed in any building with a storey 11m or more above the ground, a large-scale facade fire test should be carried out (see annex 2.E).”- Rockwool Ltd.

Factors to consider

A range of considerations were raised by some respondents who agreed with or were neutral about the proposal. Singular comments were that:

•Full scale façade tests will mitigate the risk associated with these materials.

•The intent of the guidance could be enhanced by emphasising the limits on the use of combustible sheathing over 11m.

•Findings from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 report should be noted, notably concerns of the use of BS 8414 and BS 9414 and that achieving the performance criteria in BR135 does not, in isolation, demonstrate adequacy.

•The Centre for Window and Cladding Technology guidance should be referenced.

•A competent person should assess the adequacy of a system following a large-scale façade fire test, with the basis for the assessment documented.

•The proposal appeared to contradict the guidance in clause 2.6.5.

Other views

A few respondents supported the proposed amendments. They agreed that full-scale fire tests are needed and that sheathing boards can contribute to fires.

A small number sought more details. Views were that set performance criteria would be useful, for instance, to determine when a large-scale façade test is needed, and a call to clarify the guidance as follows:

“An element arising from considering this point is to ensure that guidance is also clear that such a panel would be subject requirements for fire resistance, as part of the external wall of the building, from inside to out. Therefore, making it clear that it also requires fire testing for reaction to fire from an external fire source offers clarity that it would be subject to differing exposures.” - The Fire Sector Confederation

Regulation 8(4) and exemptions to European Classification A1 and A2

To improve UK parity and clarity of Scotland’s exemptions, the Scottish Government has proposed two exemptions to European Classification A1 and A2 components that form part of an external wall cladding system. These relate to components associated with a solar shading device and A1 fl or A2 fl-sf materials used in the top horizontal floor layer of a balcony, provided the entire layer has an imperforate substrate under it.

Q17. It is proposed to amend Regulation 8(4) to align with England (and Wales?) on these two exemptions. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions on how the current regulation could be improved.

46% of those who answered Q17 agreed and 17% strongly agreed with the proposal at Q17 (63% in total). 11% disagreed and over a quarter (26%) neither agreed nor disagreed.

Almost half of all respondents left a comment at Q17. Prevalent themes were agreement to align with England and Wales, risks of exemptions and agreement with exemptions.

Agree, align with the UK

Brief comments were left by several respondents endorsing the proposal to amend Regulation 8(4) to align with England and Wales. Reasons for support included that in matters of public safety there should be parity across jurisdictions, that it helped consistency and that it was sensible to align regulations that address the same fire risks. One noted the height of buildings affected by the regulation differs in England and Wales.

Risks of exemptions

Some respondents suggested how to mitigate risks potentially arising from the proposed exemptions, or felt that exemptions should be limited due to the risks presented.

A few commented on the exemption for components associated with a solar shading device. It was highlighted that devices covering larger areas could pose fire hazards, for instance, creating a route for fire to spread across the façade. These respondents either disagreed with the proposal or felt guidance should consider and address these risks.

Other singular comments included that:

•Verifiers should still have discretion to raise concerns where a solar shading solution is extensive, such that it would compromise a building’s ability to comply with standard 2.7.

•The Scottish Government should take expert concerns seriously regarding types of cladding or areas of a building and avoid exempting cladding that would pose a fire safety risks for occupants if left unreplaced.

•Exemptions were not necessary if a wide-ranging ban on combustible materials was deemed proportionate, so there should be no relaxation of regulations.

•While exempt, components should not be able to provide a fuel source for fire, especially fire that exits the building, e.g. window plume, and not form a continuum on the exterior of the building, to reduce the potential for external fire spread.

Agreement with exemptions

Two respondents agreed with the proposed exemptions as long as components with limited fire load were required. One felt components should conform to Euroclass A1 fl or A2 fl-sl to align with England and Wales and the alternative European classification system, used for the reaction to fire of flooring materials. They highlighted this classification standard indicates flooring materials should be non-combustible and produce very little smoke.

Exit width from rooms in non-domestic buildings

Q18. It is proposed to amend the wording in clause 2.9.8 as detailed. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions on how the current guidance could be improved.

A majority of respondents answering Q18 supported the proposal, with 66% agreeing and 11% strongly agreeing (77% in total), while 6% disagreed and 14% neither agreed nor disagreed. Support was highest among local authorities (91%) across organisation types.

Over a third of all respondents left a comment to explain their answer. The most prevalent themes were that more clarity was needed, general agreement, that it enhanced accessibility or safety, and that figures must be precise.

More clarity needed

Some highlighted a range of areas where more information would be beneficial. The most prevalent request was for detail about the implications for exits and exit doorways, such as phased evacuation strategies and their impact on exit width calculations. One suggested that Approved Document B guidance could be adopted to provide more detail.

Two respondents called for clarity on the accuracy of the proposed paragraph 2. Other singular comments were that Figure 2.7 of the NDTH appeared at odds with its guidance at section 4.2.5, to provide the rationale for the proposal, and that a case-by-case approach may be needed for conversions of traditional buildings.

General agreement

Brief comments supporting the proposal were provided by some respondents. It was felt the amended wording made sense, that it would be ‘appropriate in most cases’ to achieve the specified dimensions, and it would improve fire safety at relatively little cost.

Enhances accessibility and safety

The amended wording was felt to be beneficial for easing the exit of people from fire, particularly vulnerable people or wheelchair users. Fire engineering organisations felt the amendments aligned with current fire safety standards and best practices and could promote safe evacuation, prevent bottlenecks, and improve exit route design efficiency.

Figures must be precise

A few respondents highlighted the need for accurate figures due to their implications for construction, such as being used for risk assessments to determine building risk ratings. Respondents emphasised the need for evidence-based figures, with one recommending that a case-by-case approach may be required due to the complexity of converting historic or traditional buildings. Calls were made to reconsider the exit width figures provided in the consultation paper, with issues raised such as:

•A change could cause confusion with the figures of 1100mm and 1000mm.

•Inconsistent units or no units provided on 1.050 (should be m), then mm are used.

•What evidence exists to suggest that an opening width of not more than 1050mm is not sufficient for 225 persons, and should this be reduced to 200 persons?

•To explain the background of the exit width unit in the technical guidance, and the assumed total evacuation time of 2.5 minutes used in the calculation.

Other views

One respondent disagreed with the proposal, believing it was inappropriate to change one provision in isolation and felt it should be considered further as part of the full review of the Section 2 Fire guidance following the publication of the Grenfell Inquiry Phase 2 report. Another respondent felt the Scottish Government should take note of industry experts on whether the measures would impact the safety of occupants and consider adopting any alternative widths of doorways that would provide greater safety.

Hospitals

Q19. To avoid conflicting information and recognise current practice, it is proposed to remove the guidance in Annex 2.B of the NDTH and cite SHTM 81 Part 1 for new build. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions on how the current guidance could be improved.

Of respondents answering Q19, 59% agreed and 13% strongly agreed (72% in total), while 6% disagreed and over a fifth (22%) neither agreed nor disagreed.

Under half of all respondents left an open comment to explain their answer. Themes included factors to consider, agreement and links between the two documents.

Factors to consider

A range of suggestions were made by several respondents for the Scottish Government to consider. Comments in order of prevalence included:

•To update the Scottish Health Technical Memorandum (SHTM) 81/the ‘NHS Scotland Firecode’ and align this proposal to it.

•A call for suppression including sprinklers to be mandated in new build hospitals, or any undergoing significant renovations.

•Integrating Human and Organisational Factors (HOF) into the guidance, with details given of how this could be achieved. This individual raised this issue throughout the consultation.

•If removing the Annex from the Technical Standards affects how it is applied.

•To clarify the requirements for private hospitals, such as whether they are to meet the requirements of this guidance, or the NHS Scotland guidance.

Agree, remove Annex 2.B

Some respondents agreed that Annex 2.B could be removed, mainly to avoid duplication and the potential for confusion. For instance, it could provide clarity, reduce misinterpretation, and allow all parties to follow the same guidance. One respondent suggested tidying up the references to the Annex.

“This will provide clarity of requirement by building use. It eliminates any possibility of misinterpretation by having two locations for guidance.” - Hilti Great Britain Ltd

Links between the two documents

Comments on links between the SHTM 81 and the NDTH were noted by some. These respondents often gave detailed information, though were split as to whether they agreed with the proposal or not at the quantitative question.

Points in order of prevalence were:

•Comments on links between the SHTM 81 and the NDTH, such as to compare the differences in minimum standards or to align fire safety guidance.

•To clarify, where SHTM 81 is cited, if any parts are outwith the scope of the relevant standard or building regulation.

•Views on combining the two documents, notably incorporating the content of SHTM 81 into the Handbook and removing duplication.

•Comments on verifiers, such as whether they would be expected to review applications against the SHTM 81 guidance or if they might miss aspects when assessing hospital applications if Annex 2 were removed, as it was a useful tool.

Q20. It is also being considered to cite SHTM 81 Part 2 and 3. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions on how the current guidance could be improved.

Over seven in ten 71% of respondents answering lent their support to the proposal at Q20 including all individuals, with 65% agreeing and 6% strongly agreeing and 6% disagreeing. Almost a quarter (23%) neither agreed nor disagreed. Fire engineering organisations were most likely to support the proposal across organisation types.

Four in ten respondents left an open comment to explain their answer. The main themes were general agreement, comparisons between the documents and that more detail was needed. Comparisons between the documents have been combined with those made at Q19 and incorporated into the analysis above.

General agreement

Support for the proposal was expressed by some respondents. Singular reasons for support included that it recognised current practice, that the move towards sector-specific design guidance for hospitals was welcome, and that it provided for the fullest scope in healthcare premises design.

More clarity needed

A few respondents called for clarity, making suggestions such as referring to all relevant parts of SHTM 81, clarifying arrangements for private hospitals, and making clear the training and competencies required for fire engineers and verifiers.

Electrically controlled exit systems

Q21. It is proposed to cite BS 13637. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions on how the current guidance could be improved.

Of respondents answering Q21, 63% agreed and 11% strongly agreed (74% in total), while 3% disagreed and 23% neither agreed nor disagreed with the proposal. Higher support was evident among organisations than individuals (with 65% compared to 50% respectively strongly agreeing or agreeing).

Around four in ten respondents commented at Q21. Two themes emerged: agreement with the proposal and factors to consider.

Agree, cite BS EN 13637 in the Handbooks

Some respondents agreed that BS EN 13637 should be cited in the Technical Handbooks, though a few provided caveats (included in the next theme). Reasons for support included that systems and design are improving due to technological advances, residual locking seems to be a thing of the past and a recognition of the importance of having effective access control systems in the interest of building security and occupant safety.

“Agree that such devices can be used on a risk-based principle and quoting the relevant standard is appropriate.” - The Fire Sector Confederation

Factors to consider

Equally prevalent were comments on aspects the Scottish Government could consider, provided by some respondents. These included that:

•A flow chart should be provided to illustrate the section on electric locking and access control within the Technical Handbooks, to help reduce complexity and challenges associated with interpreting the guidance.

•Additional guidance would be needed to set out the parameters where such a locking device may be appropriate, even if it just refers to the BS guidance.

•Systems should be fully tested and compliant.

•Checking and fail-safe devices should be mandated to ensure that locks are disarmed should there be a power interruption.

•This approach should complement existing standards and not reduce the standards required within BS EN 1125 and BS EN 179.

One local authority disagreed with the proposal. It preferred that electrically controlled systems be considered only as an alternative solution, so it felt it best to keep them out of the Technical Handbooks.

Other issues relevant to this review

Q22. Do you have experience of issues affecting development which you consider have arisen from application of current fire safety standards set under building regulations.

Over two thirds (69%) of respondents answering had no experience of issues affecting development, though around three in ten had (31%). Fire engineering organisations and local authorities were most likely to have experienced issues affecting development, at 82% and 75% respectively.

The consultation paper included an open element to Q22 to allow respondents to provide additional comments or elaborate on their experience. However, this open question was not available on the Citizen Space platform. The Scottish Government will ensure that additional evidence is sought from stakeholders at the next stage of developing any new regulations or guidance.

Source page 7

The consultation proposed undertaking further research and evidence gathering to inform policy on three areas – the BS 476 national classification, Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS), and car parks and electric vehicles.

BS 476

The removal of the national classification BS 476 has been suggested following the introduction of the Harmonised European Standards for Reaction and Resistance to Fire in the Technical Handbooks. Scotland is considering alignment with England through removing the dual system of testing and classification by removing BS 476 for Vulnerability of roof coverings and Resistance to fire.

Q23. It is proposed to undertake further research and gather evidence to inform the policy. Please confirm any evidence, contribution or initial comments that would help towards this.

Three quarters of all respondents left a comment at Q23. The most prevalent themes were support for this approach, that it is good to align with England and that more work or consultation is needed on the topic.

General agreement

Several respondents expressed support to the proposal. Reasons given included:

•Tests are outdated, and manufacturers no longer test to the BS 476 standard.

•Support for a five-year transition.

•European standards were more definitive and easier to understand.

•Removing reference to fire resistance classifications would reduce market distortion and improve general levels of safety.

•It would see the final removal of the national classes for reaction to fire, and address confusion caused by the ‘low risk’ reaction to fire classification.

Aligns with elsewhere

Alignment with England, the UK or Europe was highlighted by several respondents as a positive outcome of the removal of the BS 476 standard. Respondents noted that this may help to create greater consistency, that there are already existing areas of alignment such as cross-UK building companies, and it may be easier to understand.

More work and consultation are needed

Some respondents commented that more research, evidence gathering, consultation and work on the proposed removal of the BS 476 standard is needed. Suggestions for what this should focus on were made by one or two respondents. These included: fire door maintenance, testing and standards, vulnerability of roof coverings and industry groups to work through proposed changes.

“There should be consultation with the fire door industry regarding the removal of acceptance of BS 476-22. Because of difference in measurement of temperature between the BS test and the European test, it is my belief that perfectly good fire-resisting doorsets that pass the BS test would need to be re-tested and could marginally fail, resulting in unreasonable costs for the industry.” - Individual

Possible issues and challenges

Perceived issues and challenges with the proposed removal of the BS 476 standard were raised by some respondents. These highlighted:

•Potential failings of fire-resisting door sets by following the European test.

•Impractical timescales for vulnerability of roof coatings, with a suggestion to have a transition period that aligns with fire resistance testing.

•A view that complete removal will not be straightforward.

•BS 476 standard is still used, such as for legacy projects.

Suggestions

One respondent suggested adopting a new technical assessment standard which would cover areas outside of the European classification system. Another suggested work undertaken for the Health and Safety Executive on roof installation which could be shared with the Scottish Government.

Battery Energy Storage Systems

An increase in the use of BESS installations is expected because they are effective in storing energy from renewable technologies. The consultation paper notes that battery fires are low-frequency but have high impact and, therefore, it proposes further research on BESS in domestic and non-domestic buildings to inform future policies, such as around compartmentation and early warning of fire.

Q24. It is proposed to undertake further research and gather evidence to inform the policy. Please confirm any evidence, contribution or initial comments that would help towards this.

Almost two thirds of all respondents left a comment at Q24. The most prevalent themes were general agreement, comments on risk, and suggested evidence.

General agreement

Many respondents agreed with the proposal to undertake further research and evidence gathering to inform domestic and non-domestic building policy regarding battery energy storage systems (BESS) and associated fire risk. Comments highlighted that further research is sensible and essential for developing evidence-based guidance. Respondents noted the increased use of renewable and sustainable energy technology systems, including BESS, and the importance of considering fire risk and providing guidance.

Risks and suggestions for minimisation

Several respondents raised concerns about BESS risks and made suggestions to minimise these risks, which could be addressed through the proposed research. A range of perceived risks were raised, including the risk of thermal runaway, short circuits, component faults, overheating, chemical leaks, explosions, toxic gases, and fire.

Suggestions for mitigating risks included having fire-resistant enclosures, ventilation, sprinklers including water mist, and considering BESS location. The need to develop regulation, guidance, a robust emergency response plan, implementation of safety measures, and an increased understanding of the hazards was also noted.

Disagreement was also evident, with a few respondents querying whether the frequency of BESS-related fires is higher than suggested in the consultation paper, that one metre away from buildings is insufficient, and that external buildings should not be exempt.

Suggested evidence and areas for research

Some respondents suggested existing evidence that could be considered. Suggestions were made by one or two respondents each:

•SFRS guidance.

•Paper published by Cross UK titled ‘Fire Safety concerns with lithium-ion batteries aimed at Owners and occupiers of facilities, local authorities and fire and rescue services’.

•PAS 63100 recommendations.

•Fire Industry Association guidance.

Areas that some respondents felt required more research included:

•Compartmentation, resistance, battery separation, venting, suppression, early warning in fire and other fire protection methods.

•Artificial Intelligence (AI) battery fire detection systems.

•BESS use within buildings.

•Solar PV panels and fire risks.

Car parks and electric vehicles (EVs)

The consultation paper proposed commissioning a literature review on global car park fire safety relating to electric, hybrid, and other forms of alternative energy vehicles to inform guidance and policy.

Q25. It is to proposed undertake a literature review to inform the policy on car parks and particularly in relation to electric vehicles. Please confirm any evidence, contribution or initial comments that would help towards this.

Almost two thirds of all respondents left a comment at Q25. The most prevalent themes were general agreement, suggested evidence, and the need for updated policy.

General agreement

Several respondents agreed with the proposal to undertake a literature review and research, expressing a desire to know more about whether there is a greater fire risk in electric vehicles (EVs) than combustion engine vehicles, and that undertaking research to inform policy is a sensible approach.

Suggested evidence

Some respondents noted evidence that could contribute to the literature review. This included:

•Existing research on fitting sprinklers to limit fire spreading between vehicles within carparks, from the European Fire Sprinkler Network.

•Arup technical paper T0194.

•Steel Construction Institute’s Non-Contradictory Complementary Information (NCCI): PN005 Fire Resistance Design of Composite Slabs and P359 Composite Design of Steel Framed Buildings.

•Ongoing research and literature reviews by OFR Consultants, including around structural fire resistance requirements and sprinklers in car parks containing EVs.

•Bedfordshire Fire and Rescue Significant Incident Report in the Luton Airport Carpark, published March 2024.

•Review requirements in the National Fire Protection Association standard 88 on sprinkler systems in automated car parks and related 2010 BRE research.

•UK and Australian government published guidance on carparks.

•International Council on Clean Transportation approaches to mitigate EV fires in enclosed spaces.

•National Fire Protection Association research on modern vehicle hazards in parking structures and systems.

•National Research Council Canada literature review on the parking of electric vehicles.

Policy needs updating

Some respondents highlighted the need for an updated car park policy, particularly for EVs. They highlighted the growing number of EVs and EV chargers and potential fire risks associated with them, making policy updates timely. Updates could include fire protection strategies for modern vehicles in parking garages, consideration of the construction and design of car parks, and policy specifically for EVs in car parks. Respondents also noted examples of fires in car parks, such as the 2023 Luton Airport car park fire.

Aspects to consider

Aspects to consider in the literature review were suggested by some, including:

•The increased weight of EVs for existing carparks.

•Likelihood of fire spread between cars for both EVS and internal combustion engines, and the thermal loading on the structures.

•Installation of sprinklers in open-sided car parks.

•E-bikes parked in public or domestic settings.

•Mitigation of risks associated with EV batteries and electric chargers as ignition sources and fuel contribution. This includes the installation, inspection, maintenance, monitoring systems, training, awareness and fire safety measures.

•Car park design and fires, including consideration of the fir loading of modern vehicles, EVs, Liquified Petroleum Gas (often called dual-fuel) vehicles, and risk of fuel fires from plastic fuel tanks.

•The role of local authorities in maintaining and repairing EV charging points in ‘adopted’ car parking sites, which was perceived as not cost-effective.

•Potential for policy conflicts, such as differing requirements of local authorities compared to road planning agencies.

Source page 8

The consultation asked whether there could be potential impacts or implications from the proposals in the consultation on equality groups, island communities, and business and regulation.

Equality impact assessment

Q26. Are there any proposals in this consultation which you consider to impact or have implications on equality groups? Please provide any comments below. If selecting yes, please specify which of the proposals you refer to and why you believe specific groups will be impacted?

Almost three quarters (73%) of respondents who answered Q26 felt the proposals would not impact equality groups, though 9% thought they would, and 18% were unsure.

Around two fifths of all respondents commented at Q26. The most prevalent themes were that there is no impact on equality groups and positive implications for equality groups.

No impact or no negative impact

A few respondents commented that they were unaware of any negative impacts on equality groups from the proposals in this consultation.

Positive impacts for disabled, older and vulnerable people

A small number of respondents highlighted possible positive impacts arising from the proposals. It was suggested that the changes could help protect those who are older, disabled, or more vulnerable by providing more time to escape fires. One respondent noted that direct engagement with disabled people could improve understanding of their specific requirements, e.g., the width of doors needed for wheelchairs.

Two respondents outlined perceived positive impacts from the proposals, but did not specify particular groups that would be impacted. However, they also commented that limiting fire spread could provide additional time to evacuate fires, and sprinklers could support those who are unable to leave rooms when a fire starts, thus increasing fire safety.

Other comments

One respondent expanded on why there could be negative impacts.

“Human and Organisational Factors principles are not applied in higher risk building assessments to a similar standard to that of the Major Accident Hazards Sector then people with 'Additional Needs' could be adversely impacted by these proposals. Current proposals do not fully address the potential for human error in the design, construction, commissioning, operations, and inspection and maintenance of Safety Critical Elements/equipment thus exposing people to risks greater than the ALARP level.” - Individual

Business and regulatory impact assessment (BRIA)

Q27. Do you think that any of the proposals in this consultation have any financial, regulatory or resource implications for you and/or your business (if applicable)? Please provide any comments below. If selecting yes, please specify which of the proposals you refer to and why you believe financial, regulatory or resource implications will be impacted.

Views were mixed on whether the proposals would impact businesses. Among those answering Q27, 30% felt they would, 39% felt they would not, and 30% were unsure.

One quarter of all respondents left a comment at Q27. The most prevalent themes were potential impacts on the workforce and increased costs.

Impact on workforce

Some respondents highlighted potential workforce impacts arising from the proposals. Various comments, each made by one or two respondents, included:

•Learning and development requirements to ensure verifiers are up to date on changes to standards and guidance, as well as more specialist training and associated costs for architects.

•Administrative registration costs for fire risk assessors if there is a move to registration for all UK assessors.

•Replacement of the BS 476 impact on the passive fire protection sector.

•The need for appropriately skilled installers and assessors.

Increased costs

A small number of respondents noted potential increased costs associated with the proposals. These include increased construction and building costs, increased fee income, and financial implications for the increased need for specialist consultant input for building conversions. However, one respondent commented that if significant costs are incurred, it may be because the property has not compliant with existing regulations and therefore needs more substantial upgrading.

Other comments

Two respondents commented that the proposals could result in increased demand for support to achieve compliance and regulatory clashes, namely, between these recommendations and requirements of Listed Building and Conservation Area legislation.

Concerns with the cost-benefit analysis

In addition, some respondents repeatedly raised concerns with the cost-benefit analysis referred to in the consultation document on AFSS systems in conversions of traditional buildings to hotels. These respondents provided detailed comments on the cost-benefit analysis, particularly at Q1, Q4, Q10, Q27. To avoid repetition, these comments have been consolidated and presented here.

Certain assumptions on which the cost-benefit analysis was based, or its conclusions, were challenged. Assumptions queried included, in no particular order:

•The cost-benefit analysis for BS EN 12845 fails to consider potential trade-offs when sprinklers are installed, such as reduced fire resistance requirements, increased compartment sizes and extended travel distances.

•The costs for pumps in the system were based on Ordinary Hazard 3 rather than Ordinary Hazard 1 supply, resulting in an overestimate of costs.

•Underestimated costs of damage in conversions, as they are based on mid-market, not upper-market, costs. It was felt that such properties were more likely to be upper-market.

•The total fire, smoke and water damage areas of ‘non-traditional’ hotels in the cost benefit analysis are twice that of a traditional hotel, given the associated commentary suggested modern built hotels were safer and more robust.

•Water supply costings for a hotel sprinkler installation to EN 12845 appeared more suited to an industrial building. In contrast, lighter installations requiring less water, like a hotel, would not incur such excessive costs.

•That there is a difference in benefits for a 40-bedroom hotel compared to a 20-bedroom hotel, despite the cost-benefit analysis assuming no difference.

•It was felt that if the assumptions were corrected, there could be a case for applying BS 9251 to hotels, as they would show that the benefits of installing BS 9251 sprinkler systems outweigh the costs, or that findings would then be positive for systems designed to EN 12845.

Other points raised on the cost-benefit analysis included:

•The need to undertake more research or widen the search for appropriate data on which to base the analysis given the data pool of hotel fires resulting in fatalities is very low.

•To revise the section on multi-occupancy social housing being placed in a commercial to flat conversion, for instance, as it: seemed to run counter to the premise of applying AFSS into blocks as a finding; was perceived to over-estimate maintenance costs and; did not take account of wider costs if there was a fire, such as the social costs caused by displacement of tenants.

•The examples did not seem relevant or appropriate because BS 9251 only recommends sprinkler systems for certain building types, and BS 9251 would not align with use for hotels, which could cause issues with certification.

•A need to revisit the analysis to ensure comparisons made are technically correct due to the lack of a definition for small hotels in the analysis, or that small hotels could be included in the analysis.

•Clarifying ‘ongoing maintenance costs’ with a real-world example or compared with the maintenance costs of electronic fire detection and alarm systems.

Island communities impact assessment (ICIA)

Q28. Do you think that any of the proposals in this consultation would lead to, for example, increased costs and/or impact island communities significantly different from its effect on other (if applicable)? Please provide any comments below. If selecting yes, please specify which of the proposals you refer to and why you believe financial, regulatory or resource implications will be impacted.).

One third (35%) of those answering Q28 felt the proposals would not impact island communities, compared to almost a quarter (24%) who thought they would. The remaining 41% were unsure.

A quarter of all respondents left a comment at Q28. The most prevalent themes were an increased cost burden for island communities, benefits for remote communities and infrastructure challenges.

Increased cost burden

Some respondents highlighted that costs in island communities could increase as a result of the proposals. Greater costs for island communities than those on the mainland were highlighted, especially given that there may be a lack of local specialists, e.g. fire suppression installers. Additional costs were thought to occur in island communities for maintenance, adding fire safety measures, sourcing materials from the mainland, and converting buildings to hotels. However, one respondent expressed the view that costs for the proposed measures should not be greater for island communities, except for additional transport costs.

Benefits for remote communities

Two respondents highlighted that because remote locations can be further away from fire and rescue services, fire safety improvements will be of greater benefit to islands.

“The natural isolation of islands from other geographic areas means it is more challenging to supplement fire services resources due to the transport challenges. Therefore, fire service resources required to safely fight a hotel fire will be more limited and more difficult to provide and maintain on an island. Therefore, the provision of fire suppression systems in hotels will be a greater benefit to the islands, where a fire will be suppressed or extinguished prior to the arrival of the fire service and as a result conditions will be safer for firefighters responding, allow more time for occupants to safely evacuate the premises and require less resources to resolve.” – British Automatic Fire Sprinkler Association

Infrastructure challenges

One respondent highlighted potential infrastructure issues, specifically those related to the water supply for automatic fire safety systems in remote locations.

Source page 9

The consultation paper outlines three stages of the proposed updated programme to deliver the current fire safety standards review and the commitment on recommendations from the Cameron House Hotel Inquiry.

Stage 1 is to develop policy and lay regulations. This stage spans from December 2024 to October 2025 and includes this consultation, setting out principles, supporting processes to allow for changes, continuing research, consultation analysis and impact assessments, recommendations to Ministers, and submission to seek approval to lay amendments to The Building (Scotland) Regulations 2004.

Stage 2 is to develop and deliver guidance documents. This spans Summer/ Autumn/Winter 2025 and involves published revised standards/guidance in Technical Handbooks, amended regulations/standards/guidance.

Stage 3 involved the revised standards coming into force. This stage spans from Winter 2025/early 2026 and includes amended regulations/standards/guidance coming into force, and dissemination events.

Q29. Do you agree with the proposal for amended regulations, standards and guidance to come into force early 2026?

High levels of support were given for the proposed timetable to implement the amended policy, with 84% of respondents who answered in favour compared to 3% who were not, and 13% who were unsure. All local authorities agreed with the proposal.

Two fifths of all respondents left a comment at Q29. The most prevalent themes were the need for sufficient lead-in time and associated actions, the need for timely action, and general agreement.

Lead-in time and actions required

Some respondents highlighted the need for lead-in time and other actions to ensure the industry is ready for any changes. Comments suggested a lead-in time between the publication of new standards and guidance and their taking effect, allowing the industry time to prepare for the changes. Two respondents specified this should be a minimum of six months. Other suggestions included having dissemination events, clearly explaining transition arrangements, industry awareness raising and training, and discussions with the passive fire protection sector on timescales for BS 476 changes.

The need for timely action

Some respondents suggested quickly updating guidelines and standards, as it was generally felt that safety improvements are best implemented as soon as practicable.

General agreement and disagreement

Two respondents agreed with the proposal for amended regulations, standards, and guidance to come into force in early 2026. One noted that this would allow adequate time for the required policy-making and implementation. Conversely, one respondent disagreed due to the guidance review still taking place, with an outcome yet to be published.

Regular updates and alignment with England

One respondent suggested that updates to the Building Standards technical Handbooks should only occur a maximum of once per year, and at the same time each year. Another respondent commented that it should be kept in line with the England transition in September 2029, besides the fire resistance testing requirement.

Source page 10

Individuals and organisations with detailed knowledge and varied experiences participated in the consultation, sharing their views on a proposed review of fire safety topics, including recommendations from the Cameron House Hotel FAI. The proposals addressed fire safety regulations in various potential buildings, including conversions of traditional buildings to hotels, boarding houses and hostels.

There was majority support for many of the proposals presented in the consultation. Respondents felt the proposals could enhance public safety in relevant buildings and assist fire and rescue services. The importance of having clear guidance to assist stakeholders, such as those involved in construction, verification and fire rescue, was emphasised throughout the consultation. While many respondents explained why they agreed or disagreed with the proposals, other aspects or considerations respondents felt should be addressed were often highlighted at each question.

Majority support was evident for mandating active fire suppression in certain buildings to address the special risks these presented, with occupant safety being seen as a key benefit. Factors relating to the conversion of traditional buildings were also highlighted. Introducing a clear definition of ‘hotel’ based on building size and complexity was welcomed to help determine which buildings would need suppression systems.

Varying levels of support and a range of views were expressed on proposals for other specific fire safety regulations. Respondents supported proposals to retain existing guidance, amend wording and propose revisions to the regulations and guidance, with recommendations made for aspects to include or consider. Most proposals were supported by a majority of respondents, particularly the requirement for certain buildings to display an external wall plate. Proposals to undertake further research and gather evidence on BS 476, battery energy storage systems and car parks and electric vehicles were also supported.

The proposals were felt to impact businesses more than other stakeholders, for instance, due to perceived increased costs or potential impacts on the workforce. Potential positive impacts on older, vulnerable or disabled people or for those in remote, rural areas were also noted. Respondents agreed with the suggested timeline, though calls were made for sufficient lead-in time to allow stakeholders time to prepare for implementation.

Alongside other evidence, the consultation responses provide valuable and informative evidence for the Scottish Government to draw upon when finalising their proposals.

Source page 11

The following organisations responded to the consultation and gave permission for their responses to be published.

•Aberdeen City Council

•Aberdeenshire Council

•Arup Fire

•Association of Specialist Fire Protection

•Astute Fire Engineering

•British Automatic Fire Sprinkler Association

•British Woodworking Federation

•Building Systems UK (A Tata Steel Enterprise)

•Built Environment Forum Scotland

•Chartered Institute of Architectural Technologists (CIAT)

•City of Edinburgh Council

•Comhairle Nan Eilean Siar

•Dumfries and Galloway Council

•East Ayrshire Council

•European Fire Sprinkler Network

•Hilti Great Britain Ltd

•Historic Environment Scotland

•Local Authority Building Standards Scotland (prepared by SBSH for LABSS).

•Moray Council Building Standards

•North Lanarkshire Council

•OFR Consultants

•Orkney Islands Council

•Propertymark

•Rockwool Ltd

•Scottish Fire and Rescue Service

•The Fire Sector Confederation (formally known as the ‘Fire Sector Federation’)

•The Highland Council

•The Institute of Fire Safety Managers

•The National Trust for Scotland

•The Royal Incorporation of Architects in Scotland

•West Dunbartonshire Council - Building Standards

Source page 12

AFSS Active Fire Suppression Systems

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

BESS Battery Energy Storage Systems

BRE Building Research Establishment

BS Building Standard

EN European Norm

EV Electric Vehicle

FAI Fatal Accident Inquiry

HES Historic Environment Scotland

LABSS Local Authority Building Standards Scotland

NDTH Non-domestic Technical Handbook

NHS National Health Service

PAS Publicly Available Specification

PV Photo Voltaic

SCE Safety Critical Elements

SFRS Scottish Fire and Rescue Service

SHTM Scottish Health Technical Memorandum

SLWG Short-Life Working Group

Source page 13

The consultation included 24 closed questions which asked respondents for their views on a Proposed Review of Fire Safety Topics. This appendix details the responses to these questions.

Not all respondents answered every question. Some may not have answered as they hold no strong view on the question, or it may not relate to their area of knowledge or expertise. Where those who did not answer the closed questions expressed a view in their open comments, this has been noted in the qualitative analysis.

To allow comparisons across sub-groups, the tables below present the results of the closed questions based on those who answered each question.

For clarity, each closed question shows:

•The percentage of respondents from the total sample of 40 respondents who selected each response (grey row).

•The number and percentage response among those who answered each question, broken down by individual and organisation responses (rows including and under “All answering”).

Please note that the row percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.

Q1. Which of the above two options is your preferred approach?

Option 1 - Mandate active fire suppression to all traditional buildings converted to hotel use.

Option 2 – Update the Non-domestic Technical Handbook with additional performance/risk-based guidance.

Please select only one answer and provide your reasoning in the box below.

Q2. In the context of Option 1, do you consider the term ‘hotel’ needs to be defined?

Q3. If either mandating AFSS or providing guidance on risk-based alternative approaches, do you consider there is a need to define the size and/or complexity of the building being converted? Please provide your reasoning in the box below.

Q4. Are there any further comments or observations you wish to make on the topic of provision of AFSS on conversion of traditional buldings to hotels or on the options set out? If yes, please add comments below and any background or evidence you consider useful.

Q5. We propose that the wording of paragraph 2.4 of schedule 5 of the Building (Scotland) Regulations 2004 does not require to be amended. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below.

Q7. Although planned for review it is proposed that the principles set out in current HES guidance remains suitable guidance for special risks which existing hotels and similar premises may pose through the presence of hidden cavities or voids, varying standards of workmanship, age, and the variance from current standards (Recommendation 5 of the Cameron House FAI). Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below.

Q8. We propose to change the guidance in the Non-domestic Technical Handbook to recommend cavity barriers at 10m or 20m centres above fire resisting ceilings depending on the European classification for reaction to fire (A-F) of the surface exposed in the cavity. This provision would not apply to small floor or roof cavities above a fire resisting ceiling that extends throughout the building or compartment up to a maximum of 30 m in any direction. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below.

Q9. It is proposed that the additional guidance indicated in option 2 of question 1 (clause 2.1.9 of the consultation), on identifying risk and implementing proportionate mitigating measures, be included within clause 2.0.7 (alternative approaches) and clause 2.15.7 (Conversion of traditional buildings to hotel use) of the Non-domestic Technical Handbook to strengthen and add to existing guidance. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below.

Q10. It is proposed to amend standard 2.15 and/or guidance to recognise the current Direction for low risk extensions and conversions to flats, maisonettes and social housing dwellings. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below.

Q12. The expert panel proposes the existing guidance is fit for purpose and requires not further action in this context. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q13. The guidance provided in BS 5266-1 is considered to provide sufficient illumination to assist in escape at low level and satisfy the mandatory standard. Low level way finding systems may be used to supplement protected or emergency lighting and can be considered on a case by case basis as part of the fire risk assessment. It is proposed that this key message is strengthened in existing fire safety guidance. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q14. The expert panel proposes revision of guidance in standard 2.10 to remove the need for a separate and fire resisting escape route lighting circuit. Do you agree or not agree? Please provide any suggestions on how the current guidance could be improved.

Q15. It is proposed to insert new guidance clause 2.14.10 External Premises Information as detailed. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q16. It is proposed to amend the wording in 2.7.1 as detailed. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q17. It is proposed to amend Regulation 8(4) to align with England (and Wales?) on these two exemptions. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q18. It is proposed to amend the wording in clause 2.9.8 as detailed. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q19. To avoid conflicting information and recognise current practice, it is proposed to remove the guidance in Annex 2.B of the NDTH and cite SHTM 81 Part 1 for new build. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q20. It is also being considered to cite SHTM 81 Part 2 and 3. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q21. It is proposed to cite BS 13637. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q22. Do you have experience of issues affecting development which you consider have arisen from application of current fire safety standards set under building regulations?

Q26. Are there any proposals in this consultation which you consider to impact or have implications on equality groups? Please provide any comments below. If selecting yes, please specify which of the proposals you refer to and why you believe specific groups will be impacted.

Q27. Do you think that any of the proposals in this consultation have any financial, regulatory or resource implications for you and/or your business (if applicable)? Choose from the following options: - Please give us your views

Q28. Do you think that any of the proposals in this consultation would lead to, for example, increased costs and/or impact island communities significantly different from its effect on other communities (if applicable). Please provide any comments below. If selecting yes, please specify which of the proposals you refer to and why you believe financial, regulatory or resource implications will be impacted.

Q29. Do you agree with the proposal for amended regulations, standards and guidance to come into force early 2026? Please provide information on why you agree or disagree or if you consider other actions need to be considered.

Source page 14

Q1. Which of the above two options is your preferred approach?

Option 1 - Mandate active fire suppression to all traditional buildings converted to hotel use.

Option 2 – Update the Non-domestic Technical Handbook with additional performance/risk-based guidance.

Please select only one answer and provide your reasoning in the box below.

Q2. In the context of Option 1, do you consider the term ‘hotel’ needs to be defined?

Q3. If either mandating AFSS or providing guidance on risk-based alternative approaches, do you consider there is a need to define the size and/or complexity of the building being converted? Please provide your reasoning in the box below.

Q4. Are there any further comments or observations you wish to make on the topic of provision of AFSS on conversion of traditional buildings to hotels or on the options set out? If yes, please add comments below and any background or evidence you consider useful.

Q5. We propose that the wording of paragraph 2.4 of schedule 5 of the Building (Scotland) Regulations 2004 does not require to be amended. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below.

Q6. The Scottish Government publication Fire safety guidance for existing premises with sleeping accommodation (2022) is currently being reviewed. Please provide any comments on the guidance in the text box below with regard to the special risks which existing hotels and similar premises may pose through the presence of hidden cavities or voids, varying standards of workmanship, age, and the variance from current standards (Recommendation 5 of the Cameron House FAI).

Q7. Although planned for review it is proposed that the principles set out in current HES guidance remains suitable guidance for special risks which existing hotels and similar premises may pose through the presence of hidden cavities or voids, varying standards of workmanship, age, and the variance from current standards (Recommendation 5 of the Cameron House FAI). Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below.

Q8. We propose to change the guidance in the Non-domestic Technical Handbook to recommend cavity barriers at 10m or 20m centres above fire resisting ceilings depending on the European classification for reaction to fire (A-F) of the surface exposed in the cavity. This provision would not apply to small floor or roof cavities above a fire resisting ceiling that extends throughout the building or compartment up to a maximum of 30 m in any direction. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below.

Q9. It is proposed that the additional guidance indicated in option 2 of question 1 (clause 2.1.9 of the consultation), on identifying risk and implementing proportionate mitigating measures, be included within clause 2.0.7 (alternative approaches) and clause 2.15.7 (Conversion of traditional buildings to hotel use) of the Non-domestic Technical Handbook to strengthen and add to existing guidance. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below.

Q10. It is proposed to amend standard 2.15 and/or guidance to recognise the current Direction for low risk extensions and conversions to flats, maisonettes and social housing dwellings. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below.

Q11. Please confirm any evidence, contribution or initial comment that would help towards this policy direction.

Q12. The expert panel proposes the existing guidance is fit for purpose and requires not further action in this context. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q13. The guidance provided in BS 5266-1 is considered to provide sufficient illumination to assist in escape at low level and satisfy the mandatory standard. Low level way finding systems may be used to supplement protected or emergency lighting and can be considered on a case by case basis as part of the fire risk assessment. It is proposed that this key message is strengthened in existing fire safety guidance. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q14. The expert panel proposes revision of guidance in standard 2.10 to remove the need for a separate and fire resisting escape route lighting circuit. Do you agree or not agree? Please provide any suggestions on how the current guidance could be improved.Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q15. It is proposed to insert new guidance clause 2.14.10 External Premises Information as detailed. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q16. It is proposed to amend the wording in 2.7.1 as detailed. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q17. It is proposed to amend Regulation 8(4) to align with England (and Wales?) on these two exemptions. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q18. It is proposed to amend the wording in clause 2.9.8 as detailed. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q19. To avoid conflicting information and recognise current practice, it is proposed to remove the guidance in Annex 2.B of the NDTH and cite SHTM 81 Part 1 for new build. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q20. It is also being considered to cite SHTM 81 Part 2 and 3. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q21. It is proposed to cite BS 13637. Do you agree or disagree? Please provide your reasoning in the box below. If you disagree or strongly disagree, please provide any suggestions below on how the current standard could be improved.

Q22. Do you have experience of issues affecting development which you consider have arisen from application of current fire safety standards set under building regulations?

Q23. It is proposed to undertake further research and gather evidence to inform the policy. Please confirm any evidence, contribution or initial comments that would help towards this.

Q24. It is proposed to undertake further research and gather evidence to inform the policy. Please confirm any evidence, contribution or initial comments that would help towards this.

Q25. It is to proposed undertake a literature review to inform the policy on car parks and particularly in relation to electric vehicles. Please confirm any evidence, contribution or initial comments that would help towards this.

Q26. Are there any proposals in this consultation which you consider to impact or have implications on equality groups? Please provide any comments below. If selecting yes, please specify which of the proposals you refer to and why you believe specific groups will be impacted.

Q27. Do you think that any of the proposals in this consultation have any financial, regulatory or resource implications for you and/or your business (if applicable)? Please provide any comments below. If selecting yes, please specify which of the proposals you refer to and why you believe financial, regulatory or resource implications will be impacted.

Q28. Do you think that any of the proposals in this consultation would lead to, for example, increased costs and/or impact island communities significantly different from its effect on other (if applicable). Please provide any comments below. If selecting yes, please specify which of the proposals you refer to and why you believe financial, regulatory or resource implications will be impacted.

Q29. Do you agree with the proposal for amended regulations, standards and guidance to come into force early 2026?

Source page 15

1The two Building Standards Technical Handbooks – one for domestic, and one for non-domestic, buildings - set out how to achieve building regulations in practice.

2 A further response from an individual was removed from the analysis as their response was not within the scope of the consultation.

3 ‘Bow-tie barriers’ are control measures within a Bow-tie diagram, a risk management tool that aims to prevent a hazard from escalating into a negative consequence.

4 SCEs are the equipment and systems that provide the basis of risk management associated with Major Accident Hazards.